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As long as our enterprise system remains free, competitive pressures will
continue to shift and with these shifts the hand of official trade regulation must
adjust its pressures accordingly. It is important to the continuation of free
enterprise that government authorities represented by the Congress, the courts
and the Federal Trade Commission and the Department ofJustice recognize at
all times that the very freedom they are pledged to preserve is itself a fluid and
changing pattern, and that the protection of it, through official means, must
respond to such changes. If the search for certainty in the law produces a
tendency toward rigidity in the regulatory pattern, then the freedom, instead of
being preserved, might well be diminished. I
INTRODUCTION
Under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act,2 price discrimination3 may be illegal under certain cir-
1. A. SAWYER, BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PRICING UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
319 (1963).
2. Clayton Act, § 2, as amended by Robinson-Patman Act of June 19, 1936, ch.
592, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982)).
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cumstances. 4 Although discriminatory pricing is scrutinized under a
number of statutes,5 the Robinson-Patman Act is the most generally
applicable statute governing discriminatory commercial conduct be-
cause it is the principal statute applicable to the prices charged by a
seller to its buyers.6 Since its enactment in 1936, there has been
considerable debate over the real purpose of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 7 with most of the debate centered around the issue of interpre-
3. Various definitions have been advanced for the term as applied to the Robin-
son-Patman Act. " 'Economic' price discrimination consists in selling a product to
different customers at prices that bear different ratios to the marginal costs of sales to
those customers." Under the Robinson-Patman Act "price discrimination is mea-
sured by the difference between the high price to one purchaser and the lower price
to another." A. SAWYER, supra note 1, at 234. "Price discrimination is the practice of
selling some homogeneous product - a good of 'like grade and quality' - to differ-
ent buyers at different prices." D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR
REPEAL 45 (1986). While a Robinson-Patman price discrimination complaint is trig-
gered by a price difference, not all price differences are prohibited. Only those price
differences which are predatory in nature and fail to satisfy the statutory defenses are
prohibited.
4. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce .... and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
5. "There are antitrust statutes applicable to numerous situations such as those
involving import and export trade, those involving special or partial exemptions or
administrative procedures and those applicable to particular businesses .... " Loev-
inger, Antitrust Means Economic Freedom, in 1 HOFFMAN'S ANTITRUST LAW & TECH-
NIQUES 149 (1963) [hereinafter Economic Freedom]. Other antitrust statutes include
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982), and the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
6. The Federal Trade Commission Act and the Sherman Act are also relevant in
such matters. In addition to prohibition of price discrimination between purchasers,
almost all interstate sale and dealer-oriented promotions are subject to the terms of
the Act. Examples include unearned brokerage payments, promotional allowances
and services. Buyers are similarly liable for inducing or receiving prohibited price
discriminations. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONO-
GRAPH No. 4, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW, VOLUME I at 2 (1980)
[hereinafter MONOGRAPH].
The Robinson-Patman Act's influence on the economy is so pervasive "that tens
of thousands, probably hundreds of thousands, of pricing decisions every year are
altered through fear of Robinson-Patman." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 384 (1978) [hereinafter ANTITRUST PARADOX].
7. SeeJ. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS: THEIR ADMINISTRATION, IN-
TERPRETATION, AND EFFECT (1958). "A discussion of the particular role of the Robin-
son-Patman Act in the field of the antitrust laws is in effect an examination of the
relationship between the Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act." Id. at 117.
(Vol. 14
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tation, both as to its general language, 8 and as to the application of
the statutory defenses. 9
Part I of this Note will present the historical development of the
meeting competition defense and the status of the Robinson-Patman
Act.10 Generally, whether conduct meets the good faith standard is a
The Robinson-Patman Act "provides that it is unlawful to discriminate in price, di-
rectly or indirectly, between different purchasers of the same or similar commodity
where the effect may be to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." Eco-
nomic Freedom, supra note 5, at 149.
8. See J. VAN GISE, W. LIFLAND & L. SORKIN, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 56-57 (1986) [hereinafter VAN GISE].
[T]he Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, is the most awkwardly drafted of all
antitrust legislation. This statute was a roughly hewn, unfinished block of
legislative phraseology when it left Congress, and has required much inter-
pretive refinement by the Commission and the courts to reveal the contours
of its meaning and application. Indeed, so confusing is certain of this lan-
guage that experience in applying its provision is the only reliable guide for
the wise practitioner.
Id; see also H. KRONSTEINJ. MILLER & I. SCHWATZ, MODERN AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW
104 (1958). " 'Since precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of
the Robinson-Patman Act,' numerous difficult and controversial questions remain as
to the interpretation and policy of the Sherman Act." Id. (quoting Automatic Can-
teen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953)). For further discussion of the prob-
lem of interpretation see Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty- Year
Perspective, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1957) [hereinafter Rowe, Evolution]; see also
Rowe, Price Diferentials and Product Diferentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 66 YALE LJ. 1 (1956) [hereinafter Rowe, Price Differentials].
9. A price discrimination practice which is violative of Section 2(a) of the Act,
may nevertheless be permitted if the seller satisfies the statutory requirements of
Section 2(b), the so-called "meeting competition" defense. Price discrimination may
also be permitted if the seller satisfies the cost justification requirements of Section
2(a).
The Section 2(a) defense of the Robinson-Patman Act states in part:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered... And provided further,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to
time where in response to changing conditions affecting the Market ....
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). In addition, Section 2(b) provides in part that:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebut-
ting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the
furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor.
Id. § 13(b) (emphasis added).
The difficulty in applying the meeting competition defense has occurred mainly
in the determination of good faith since such an analysis is a subjective inquiry into
the state of mind of the seller. " 'Good Faith' means that he [seller] may act without
fear, provided that there are not additional facts which indicate that he is thereby
seeking to implement an indefensible trade practice, an unlawful conspiracy, or a
plan of monopoly." VAN GISE, supra note 8, at 146.
10. See infra notes 15-88 and accompanying text.
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question of fact, determined on a case-by-case basis. I I In developing
the good faith standard, various dichotomies have evolved which
have been considered relevant in the determination of good faith.12
Where a competitor has invaded a seller's defined market, the seller
may choose to respond by confronting the competitor on a customer
by customer basis, or instead, take an approach that confronts the
competitor in the entire area invaded or threatened. The question of
whether the seller takes the piecemeal approach or opts for the so-
called "area-wide" approach is one such dichotomy which has
evolved as an important issue in the determination of good faith and
the availability of the meeting competition defense. Part II examines
the judicial development of area-wide pricing, its effect on the meet-
ing competition defense, and its future viability as a meeting compe-
tition scheme.'1 Finally, Part III examines the evidentiary
requirements for a successful meeting competition defense in an
area-wide pricing system.14
11. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435-43 (1978).
12. Some of these dichotomies include:
(A) The lawful versus unlawful character of the competitive price met. In
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979), the Supreme
Court rejected the need for a seller to prove the lawfulness of the price met.
Id. at 81.
(B) Individual competitive situation versus a pricing system (or sporadic,
but not systematic meeting competition). In Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Bev-
erage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983), the Court concluded that "[tihere is no
evidence that Congress intended to limit the availability of § 2(b) to cus-
tomer-specific responses." Id. at 448.
(C) In the past it was generally accepted that a seller may "meet but not
beat" the competitive price. Recent decisions, however, have recognized
that where the seller acts in good faith to meet competition, the fact that its
price is lower than the competitor's price is not fatal. Accord Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 440 U.S. at 83; Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568, 572-73
(5th Cir. 1970) (inadvertent undercutting of price is not fatal if made in
good faith); see also Indian Coffee Corp. v. The Folger Coffee Co., 1982-83
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,186, at 71,732-33 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
(D) The defensive versus aggressive nature of the seller's action in meet-
ing competition (meeting competition to retain a customer or meeting com-
petition to gain a new customer). The Supreme Court, in Falls City, held
that the Act does not distinguish between prices offered to retain existing
customers, and tho3e offered to gain new customers. Falls City, 460 U.S. at
435; accord William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1046 (9th Cir. 1982) (defense is not forfeited simply because
new customers are sought).
(E) An earlier dichotomy was the substantive versus procedural issue.
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (Supreme Court held that the
defense once established is absolute).
13. See infra notes 89-198 and accompanying text. A detailed consideration of
the various cases would be beyond the scope of this Note. The intent is to give an
overview of the general trends and commonalities of the decisions, except for those
landmark cases from which the laws governing area-wide pricing emanate, which will
be discussed in some detail.
14. See infra notes 199-287 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14
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I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEETING COMPETITION
DEFENSE UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
[T]his is not a statute which can be studied in a vacuum. Rather,
it is necessary to consider the Robinson-Patman Act in light of its
complicated legislative history, its relationship to the body of anti-
trust law to which it is, however morganatically, wed, and the way it
has been interpreted over the past half-century.'
5
Initial understanding of the history and development of the Robin-
son-Patman Act provides the flood light under which any meaningful
analysis of its implications can be effectively attempted.16 Further-
more, for the practitioner such background knowledge is particularly
useful since judicial interpretation of the clients' conduct will invaria-
bly be conducted under the same flood light.
17
A. Legislative History of the Robinson-Patman Act
It is clear from the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act
that it was enacted in response to a perceived threat to the traditional
structure of distribution brought about by the advent of chain stores
and other concentrations of buying power.' 8 The dramatic increase
in the early 1900's in the number of chain stores was perceived by
15. Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (8th Cir. 1987).
16. "For it is in its genesis that the purposes animating Congress in passing this
ambiguous statute can best be discerned and then borne carefully in mind in contem-
porary judicial applications." Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1138
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
17. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Henry is indicative of such application of leg-
islative history. Henry, 809 F.2d 1334; accord Boise Cascade: "The imprecision in-
fecting the statutory language has frequently led courts construing the measure to
repair to the backdrop against which the Robinson-Patman amendments were crafted
in 1937." Boise Cascade, 837 F.2d at 1138.
18. See LaRue, The Robinson-Patman Act: The Great Issues and Personalities, 55 ArI-
TRUST L.J. 135, 137 (1986). During that period the traditional system of distribution
was local family-run stores, the so-called "corner shop." It was feared that the
growth of the retail chains during this period threatened the very existence of the
independent wholesalers by their ability to buy direct from the manufacturers at sub-
stantially low prices, thus reducing margins to independent retailers. It was felt that
chain stores were popular with consumers because they were able to sell at relatively
lower prices than could the independent stores. Furthermore, it was felt that chain
stores were able to offer such attractive prices because of the favorable prices they
were able to "coerce" from suppliers. Id.
"Congress found that the 'survival of independent merchants, manufacturers,
and other businessmen' continued to be threatened by forms of direct and indirect
discrimination - in price and other terms - that were not reached by the original
Clayton Act." VAN GiSE, supra note 8, at 21. This fear was expressed by Mr. Patman
in the hearings before the House Committee when he stated:
The day of the independent merchant is gone unless something is done and
done quickly. He cannot possibly survive under that system. So we reached
the crossroads; we must either turn the food in groceries' business of this
country ... over to a few corporate chains, or we have got to pass laws that
1988]
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some to be the cause of the demise of the independent retailer dur-
ing the same period.19 In 1928, the Senate, concerned about the
competitive effect of this emerging system of distribution directed
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate the legality of
chain stores. The Committee's report, 20 issued in 1934, was to a
great extent, the basis of the Robinson-Patman Act which was en-
acted in 1936.
In the Final Report, the Commission reported that the affirmative
defenses of the original Clayton Act 2' rendered its enforcement
practically ineffective.22 In particular, the Commission attacked the
good-faith meeting competition defense.23
In its recommendations the Senate Judiciary Committee removed
the meeting competition proviso, finding it to be a major weakness of
will give the people, who built this country in time of peace and who saved it
in time of war, an opportunity to exist.
Hearings Before the House Committee on judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1935).
19. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 9. The records indicated that in 1900, there
were 700 chain stores. By 1910, the number had grown to 3000, and by 1930 there
were about 7000 chain stores in the country. Over the same period their share of the
total retail business grew from just 4 % in 1919, to 9 % in 1926, and 25 % by 1933.
Some commentators are not persuaded that the success of the chain stores was
merely the result of purchasing power. See, e.g., Rowe, Evolution, supra note 8, at 1062
n.n.8-9. "Actually, the statistics developed by the FTC indicates that the chains'
lower purchase prices were but a minor factor in their ability to undersell the in-
dependent retailers. The responsible factors were the chains' bypassing of the
wholesaler and buying direct, and their more efficient operations." LaRue, supra
note 18, at 137 n.8.
20. FTC, CHAIN STORES: FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, S.
Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
21. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). The section reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers . . . : Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance.
Id.
22. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) (cited inJ. VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAws & TRADE REGULATIONS § 32.02 [11, 32.12 (1987)).
23. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 12, n.46 (citing FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at
51).
Difficult legal questions arise in this connection, such as whether a price
discriminator may merely 'meet' the price of a competitor or may beat it,
and whether a concern which occupies a monopolistic position has the right
to maintain itself by discriminating in g6od faith to meet competition. If the
monopoly be considered legal it is difficult to deny it the same privilege of
protection against competition which the statute assures the independent.
Yet that creates the anomaly of a monopoly being allowed to use the same
weapons to maintain itself which are denied to others for fear of creating
monopoly.
[Vol. 14
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the original Act.24 At the same time, the HouseJudiciary Committee
reinstated the proviso in its version but in a more restricted form.2 5
Both bodies subsequently adopted the House version but rejected
the House recommendation that the proviso be an absolute legal re-
buttal.26 Instead, they declared that the meeting-competition pro-
viso "was intended to operate only at [sic] a rule of evidence in a
proceeding before the Federal Trade Commission."27
B. Purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act
In light of the history and initial justification of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, opponents have often attacked the Act on the ground that
its foundation in legislative concern for small business implies a lack
of concern for competition in general. 28 The argument that the
24. J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATIONS § 32.02 [1],
32.11, n.14 (1987) (citing S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4 (1936)).
[I]t permits discrimination to meet competition, . . . with destructive conse-
quences to the central object of the bill. Liberty to meet competition which
can be met only by price cuts at the expense of customers elsewhere, is in its
unmasked effect the liberty to destroy competition by selling locally below
cost, a weapon progressively the more deadly to the competitor of limited
resources, whatever his merit and efficiency.
Id.
25. In the House bill, "seller [was] permitted to meet local competition, it [did]
not permit him to cut local prices until his competitor [had] first lower[ed] prices,
and then he [could] go no further than to meet those." Id. at n.15 (citing H. REP. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936)).
26. Id. at n.21 (citing H. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936)).
[A] seller may show that his lower price was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor .... It is to be noted, however, that this
does not set up the meeting of competition as an absolute bar to a charge of discrimina-
tion under the bill. It merely permits it to be shown in evidence. This provision
is entirely procedural .... This procedural provision cannot be construed as a
carte blanche exemption to violate the bill.
Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 32.12 (citations omitted).
28. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 15.
[T]he bill was characterized as (a) an effort to salvage that part of the NRA
[National Retail Association] which benefitted independent merchants and
wholesalers, (b) a means of saving independent businessmen from the chain
store "menace," and (c) a way of preventing the use of concentrated buying
power to extract concessions that were unwarranted by any actual saving to
the manufacturer. It was, however, as an antichain measure that the Patman bill
received its widest publicity.
Id.; see also Note, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1289,
1336 (1948). "The Robinson-Patman Act was designed to aid small buyers and to
hamper the chain stores." Accord Bouldis v. United States Suzuki Motor Corp., 711
F.2d 1319, 1326 (6th Cir. 1983) (aim of the Robinson-Patman Act, amending section
13 and adding section 13(a), (b) and 21(a) of Clayton Act, is to prevent large buyer
from gaining discriminatory preferences over small buyer solely because of large
buyer's greater purchasing power).
As a result of this express concern for small business, the Robinson-Patman Act
has been extensively labeled as an anti-competition statute. For example, it has been
19881
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Robinson-Patman Act is invalid merely because it was born out of
concern for the small retailer is, however, unpersuasive. Even
though Congress may have focused its attention on the predatory
purchasing practices2 9 of chain stores, the Robinson-Patman Act is
not to be rigidly confined to that set of circumstances alone. While
protection of the independent retailer may have been the "short
range goal" of the Act, its main objective was the "long range pro-
tection of competition."30 The Act was designed to protect small
businesses, not for the sake of the individual firms, but for the sake
of competition in general.
Considerable disagreement still remains over the real purpose of
the Robinson-Patman Act and its place in the overall antitrust
scheme which is to protect competition. 3 1 It has been suggested, for
suggested that the Act contributes to price rigidity, aids price-fixing efforts and oligo-
polistic behavior, discourages entry into new markets, fosters inefficient distribution
schemes, encourages inefficient product differentiation, and imposes an undue regu-
latory burden on businesses. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 27; see generally P. SAMUEL-
SON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 42-44 (1947); see also Shniderman, The
Impact of the Robinson-Patman Act on Pricing Flexibility, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 173 (1962) (Act
may be means of obtaining price uniformity and discouraging competition).
29. Predatory price cutting is "the attempt to destroy competition and attain a
monopoly in some market which can henceforth be isolated from the intrusion of
others." M. ADELMAN, GEOGRAPHICAL PRICE DIFFERENTIALS: AN ECONOMIC COMMEN-
TARY, HOFFMANN'S ANTITRUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES, Vol. 2, 577, 579 (M. Hoffmann
& A. Winard 1963).
Congress, in drafting the Robinson-Patman Act, distinguished between size
achievement by normal trade practices and size gained by means aimed at eliminating
competition. The latter means is considered predatory, and it is this form of discrim-
inatory pricing that is expressly prohibited by the Act.
30. Some commentators have found these two goals to be in basic conflict stating
that they cannot be simultaneously achieved by any one rule. They argue that "[iut is
hard to protect competitors and competition at the same time. For it is competition
from which competitors seek to be protected." Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 ANTITRUST
L.J. 18, 19 (1976). Others have found the Robinson-Patman Act to be "a law that
attacks a nonexistent threat and hinders the free movement of prices in markets
needlessly. The policy of Robinson-Patman is directly contrary to the Sherman Act
rule against price fixing. They cannot both be considered sound antitrust policy."
ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at 394 (footnote omitted).
Proponents of the Act argue that to the extent that enforcement of the Act bene-
fits small business competitors, it is only incidental to its overall antitrust goal of
protecting competition. They argue that the Robinson-Patman Act, though designed
to protect competitors, also protects competition.
31. ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at 64.
At worst, then, the policy goal of the Robinson-Patman Act is left unclear by
the various statements made during the legislative history of the measure.
More accurately, however, the legislative history shows predominant con-
cern for consumers, with protection of small competitors intended only
when that was a means of protecting consumers from monopoly not based
on efficiency.
Id. Contra Note, supra note 28, at 1334. This author defends the Robinson-Patman
Act, stating that "[iut would be an unjust exaggeration to say that the sponsors of the
[Vol. 14
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example, that there is a basic conflict in policies between the Robin-
son-Patman Act and the Sherman Act. It is argued that because the
Robinson-Patman Act was designed to protect the competitors, it is
antithetical to the overall antitrust goal of protecting competition.32
Critics of the Act argue that this apparent difference in motivation is
prima facie evidence that the two acts are divergent. However, this
argument ignores the direct relationship between individual compet-
itors and competition in general.33
If competition is comprised of individual competitors, then any sys-
tematic attack or elimination of the individual competitors invariably
disturbs competition. The only question, once this occurs, is
whether the instability thus created benefits or harms the consumer.
The answer will depend on the circumstances of the given case, the
dynamics of the given market, the level of competition, and the barri-
ers to entry. Thus, where it can be established that the injury to a
competitor is part of a systematic plan aimed at reducing competi-
tion, the requisite injury to competition should be deemed
established.
Opponents of the Robinson-Patman Act argue that by protecting
competitors the Act ignores the consumer.34 This argument ignores
the actual effect of the present Act. In fact, the Robinson-Patman
Act in some cases permits injury to competition such as when the
attendant price discrimination is the result of "general competitive
pricing."35 Concededly, the concerns for "small business and fair-
ness" is sometimes in conflict with the free operation of competi-
tion.36 In fact, it has been recognized that "protecting competitors
from this type of price discrimination does not always maximize 'con-
sumer welfare.' "37 From its inherent shortcomings, however, it can-
not be concluded that the Robinson-Patman Act is either anti-
competitive or anti-consumer. Occasional divergence from the pub-
Robinson-Patman Act intended simply to injure competition in order to protect cer-
tain competitors." Id.
32. There have been numerous articles and debates on the relationship between
these two laws. For a list of authorities on the subject, see MONOGRAPH, supra note 6,
at 21.
33. "Competition does not exist in a vacuum; it consists of rivalry among com-
petitors." Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 830 F.2d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987). Accord
Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1157 (D.C.Cir. 1988) ("Often, injury to
competitors does involve ... some impact on competition.") (Mikva, J., dissenting).
34. See ANrITRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at 63.
35. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 24, at § 32.02 [1]. Cf. Foremost Dairies, Inc.
v. FTC, 348 F:2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965) ("[W]here the
record indicates a price differential substantial enough to cut into the purchaser's
profit margin .. .an inference of injury may properly be indulged.") (emphasis
added).
36. Boise Cascade Corp., 837 F.2d at 1159 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
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lic policy concerns for competition and consumer welfare is not an un-
common phenomenon of antitrust law enforcements in general.
Both the Robinson-Patman Act, which begins with the individual
competitor, and the Sherman Act, which is concerned with competi-
tion in general, are consistent with the overall antitrust policy and
ultimately benefit the consumer. 38 Viewed in this light, both the
Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act are, in fact, consistent
with the overall objectives of the antitrust laws.39
The underlying assumption of the Robinson-Patman Act is that
predatory pricing40 has been and remains an important tool of aspir-
ing monopolists.41 Another underlying.assumption is "that price fa-
38. If the overall antitrust goal is to foster competition for the ultimate benefit of
the consumer, then, since competition comprises a group of individual competitors,
it is reasonable to expect that any law that protects either consumers or individual
competitors protects competition and therefore, benefits the consumer.
39. See generally BURNS, supra note 7, at 127. Both Acts prohibit certain types of
competition - those types that destroy competition and create a monopoly. Simi-
larly, both acts condemn price discrimination as one of the prohibited methods of
competition. Id.
40. While there is no universally accepted definition of the term "predatory pric-
ing", the term is "generally used to describe the adoption of a pricing policy that
somehow restricts competition by driving out existing rivals or by excluding potential
rivals from the market." Jaskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pric-
ing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219 (1979); see also Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reduc-
tions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L. J. 1 (1979).
The courts and commentators continue to seek a common definition for the
term. The Ninth Circuit has taken the position that "[piricing is predatory only
where the firm foregoes short-term profits in order to develop a market position such
that the firm can later raise prices and recoup lost profits .... Janich Bros., Inc. v.
American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829
(1978).
In Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 711 (1975), the authors proposed a test where a
price would not be considered predatory if it equals or exceeds the marginal cost of
producing the product since "pricing at marginal cost is the competitive and socially
optimal result." Id. at 713. Under this test, pricing below marginal cost should be
conclusively presumed illegal.
It has also been suggested that "a distinction must be maintained between a
'predatory price' and a 'competitive' one. Constraints must be developed that will
deter the former, but not the latter." William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 1981). To say that the Robin-
son-Patman Act is antithetical to competition is to ignore this important distinction
between predatory and competitive pricing which the courts have continued to em-
phasize. It is an important distinction because "[p]rice reductions that constitute a
legitimate, competitive response to market conditions are entirely proper." Id.
41. For example, in William Inglis there was evidence that the consulting firm of
McKinsey & Co., which had been retained by the defendant, Continental, had pre-
pared a report in which it analyzed pricing in the relevant market. Among the issues
McKinsey suggested to Continental for further consideration was "the possibility of
'maintain[ing] [low] prices to hasten wholesaler exit pace.'" William Inglis, 668 F.2d
at 1055. Such practices are clearly predatory in nature.
[Vol. 14
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voritism was responsible for the growth of the large retail chains at
the expense of the independent retailer."4 2 On the other hand,
"[t]he presumption behind the Sherman Act is that the function of
public policy is to remove such restraints on competitive behavior
and to stop such business conduct as may lead to the destruction or
substantial weakening of competition."43 The drafters of the Sher-
man Act believed that once this objective was met the business com-
munity would then be free to set pricing as the market would bear.44
Various arguments have been advanced by opponents of the
Robinson-Patman Act to support the proposition that the Act is in
conflict with basic antitrust objectives.45 These arguments are based
on the false premise that "[p]rice discrimination should not be ex-
pected to injure competitors in any improper way." 46 While fair
price discrimination should not be expected to injure competitors,
the Robinson-Patman Act recognizes that unfair price discrimination
should be expected to, and does injure competitors.47
The Eighth Circuit is in agreement with this reasoning."8 While
merely showing an injury to a specific competitor is not sufficient to
show competitive injury, showing such injury provides a relevant
starting point for inquiry into the possible existence of injury to com-
petition of the type prohibited by the Act. 49 Two standards have
42. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 2-3; see also 3 KINTNER & BAUER, FEDERAL ArI-
TRUST LAW, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT § 18.4, at 9 (1983) [hereinafter FEDERAL AN-
TrrUST LAW]. The Act was founded on the premise that the protection of small
business is a proper and achievable objective, and that discrimination is harmful to
competition.
43. BURNS, supra note 7, at 118.
44. See id.
45. For example, it has been suggested that the Robinson-Patman Act encour-
ages price uniformities which is adverse to consumer interest. It is suggested that the
Act "discourage[s] certain structural changes in the methods of business conduct
which are a natural result of the competitive contest" and that it constitutes an at-
tempt to impede efficient marketers in distributing goods more cheaply to the con-
sumers. Monograph, supra note 6, at 27; see also BURNS, supra note 7, at 121. For
other criticisms of the Act, see SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF EcONoMIc ANALYSIS 42-
44 (1947); see also Shniderman, supra note 28.
46. ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at 385.
47. See Cohen, Let's Retain It, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 44, 48 (1976). "A large company
[could] go into a local area, cut its prices, knock out the local [competitors], and then
move on somewhere else and do the same thing until there [are] no more significant
competitors left." Id. This is possible because even a highly competitive market is
comprised of pockets, or market segments with the characteristics of a monopoly.
The degree of competition in any given industry is defined by the relative sizes of
these pockets of monopolies.
48. Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir. 1987). "[Wlhile injury
to a competitor may result from honest competition (encouraged under the antitrust
laws), this same honest competition is compromised when a market participant acts
with the intention of destroying its competitors." Id.
49. See id. at 1340.
1988]
11
Nwaneri: The "Good Faith" Meeting Competition Defense to a Section 2(A) Vi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
evolved for the determination of competitive injury. The plaintiff
may show competitive injury "either directly by market analysis ...
or by inference from injury to the plaintiff-competitor accompanied
by the defendant's predatory intent .... "50
In order to protect and encourage fair competition, a higher bur-
den is placed on a plaintiff who challenges a competitor's prices on
the grounds of individual injury. In order to show injury sufficient
for a Robinson-Patman price discrimination violation under these
circumstances, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant had
the specific intent to injure the plaintiff.5' The foregoing demon-
strates that the Robinson-Patman Act is concerned only with unfair
price discrimination.52
Furthermore, the suggestion that the Robinson-Patman Act
equates price differentials with price discrimination53 is equally erro-
neous. In reality, the Act clearly attempts to accomodate justifiable
economic price differentials by making "due allowance for differ-
ences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which" the comodities are sold or
delivered.54 In addition, the Act permits price differences "made in
good faith to meet an equally low price by a competitor."55
Opponents further argue that the Robinson-Patman Act is on a
futile mission because there exists no easy means of identifying price
discrimination.56 However, mere difficulty of administration is not a
persuasive argument for doing away with a law whose objectives are
otherwise valid.
The original Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act
were intended to reinforce the Sherman Act and to protect consum-
ers from the predatory practices of monopolists.57 Even though the
The naked demonstration of injury to a specific competitor without more is
not sufficient to show that a price discrimination may substantially lessen
competition .... The Federal Trade Commission also has long said that it
is not enough simply to establish that individual sellers have been injured,
or that some competitors have left the market.
Id. (citations ommitted).
50. Id. at 1344.
51. See id. at 1341. "[A]t the heart of these cases is the sense that 'a focus on
detrimental effects on competition, rather than a concern with individual competitors is
fundamental to a reconciliation of the Robinson-Patman Act with overall antitrust
policies.' " Id. (citations omitted).
52. The affirmative defenses of the Robinson-Patman Act attempt to do this by
permitting price discriminations that are supported by sound business practices.
Thus, not all Robinson-Patman price discrimination actions in which the plaintiff has
been injured are resolved in favor of the complainant.
53. See ANTrrRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at 399.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
.55. Id. § 13(b).
56. See ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at 399.
57. See id. at 63.
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Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 was an amendment to the original
Clayton Act, it is still said to be in basic conflict with the interests of
consumers.58 However, the legislative history shows that the draft-
ers were motivated by the interests of consumers, wage earners,
farmers, and the general welfare of the people by preserving compe-
tition.50 Proponents of the Act concede that the immediate concern
of the drafters was the prevention of injury to competitors victimized
by discrimination.60 However, they argue that it was the belief of
Congress that it is in fact "only through such injuries, [that] the
larger general injury [to competition] result." 6 l
Both Acts, in fact, contribute in different but important ways to the
protection of competition.62 While the Sherman Act primarily en-
forces competition, the Robinson-Patman Act controls it.63 Unchecked,
58. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1977)
[hereinafter JUSTICE REPORT]. It has also been argued that limiting the availability of
the defenses restricts competition to unnecessary levels. This criticism reflects a gen-
eral frustration with the lack of guidelines from past judicial decisions on the subject.
Nevertheless, the courts have repeatedly held that "[wihere . . . a price differential
threatens injury . . . [to competition] the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act [as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act] . . . are directed at the same economic evil
and have the same substantive content." Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling
Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829
(1978); see also International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 720
n.10 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
59. See Rowe, Price Differentials, supra note 8, at 2-4; see generally 80 CONG. REC.
3447 (1936); 79 CONG. REC. 11575 (1935). Cf. ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at
63.
60. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1339 (citing S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1936)). "And to catch a weed in the seed will keep it from coming to flower." Id.;
accord Recent Efforts to Amend Or Appeal the Robinson-Patman Act, 94th Cong., 1 st Sess. 41
(1976).
By nipping in the bud price favoritism, the Robinson-Patman Act is able to
forestall eventual Sherman Act difficulties which would likely arise if the
price discrimination were permitted to continue.
Id. Since the statute requires a threat of injury to competition, where there is no
likelihood of such injury to competition, clearly, it will not protect the individual
competitor. Supporters of the Act argue that this being the overall purpose of the
act, it can hardly be contrary to the overall antitrust policies.
62. One commentator, reflecting on a system without these regulations describes
a free system where the seller
could merge at will, boycott his enemies and reward his friends, tie the sale
of commodities to purchase of other products, achieve monopoly power,
misrepresent the quality of his goods, launder money, evade taxes, and gen-
erally hang loose and get rid of all inhibitions. [In the final analysis] few
rational people would say there should be no regulatory restraints.
Shniderman, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Critical Appraisal, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 149, 152-
53 (1986).
63. Hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act, and
Related Matters of the House Committee on Small Business, H.R. REP. No. 94-1738, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter Small Business Report]. See HOWREY, GOOD FAITH
19881
13
Nwaneri: The "Good Faith" eeting ompetition Defense to a Section 2(A) Vi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
freedom to price can be used by the powerful (not necessarily the
most efficient) corporations to undermine the smaller and financially
"weaker" firms (not necessarily the least efficient).64 This is pre-
cisely the type of anti-competitive outcome that the Robinson-Pat-
man Act was designed to prevent. 65
C. Status of the Robinson-Patman Act
In the midst of the foregoing debate, courts have attempted to rec-
oncile the perceived inconsistencies between the Robinson-Patman
Act and the overall antitrust goals.66 In the period following enact-
ment of the Robinson-Patman Act, it was soon recognized that the
language of the Act was vague and confusing67 and that the courts
would have difficulty in interpreting it.68 These difficulties have led
to calls for reform69 and, in some cases, calls for outright repeal of
the Act.70
The disadvantages of an anti-price discrimination law suggested by
opponents of the Robinson-Patman Act may be more illusory than
real. 71 On the other hand, to accept the Act as a totally effective and
MEETING OF COMPETITION, How TO COMPLY WITH THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 47
(1957).
64. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 24, § 32.02 [1], at 32-12, 13 n.21.
65. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 522 (1963).
Enforcement of the Act must balance two conflicting public policies-the
freedom of businessmen to price their goods flexibly in response to the va-
rying pressures of the market; and at the same time, curbs on the exercise of
that freedom in ways that thwart the objectives of the statute as to competi-
tion and competitive opportunity.
Id.; see VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 24, at § 32.02 [1]; see also infra note 73 and accom-
panying text.
66. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, (1951). "[T]he whole philoso-
phy of the Sherman Act is to go out and compete. Now the whole philosophy we are
asked to enforce here is that you really must not, you should let this business go, and
not meet the competition." Id.
67. See, e.g., FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1968) (the "amend-
ments by no means represent an exemplar of legislative clarity"); Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953) (precision of expression is not an outstanding
characteristic of the Act).
68. See ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AT 20
(Supp. 1964). Representative Celler, describing the Act as a "hodgepodge," stated
that the language "contain[ed] many inconsistencies, and the courts will have the
devil's own job to unravel the tangle .... I d. (citing 80 CONG. REC. 9491 (1936)).
69. AD HOC SUBOMITFEE ON ANTITRUST, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND RE-
LATED MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, RECENT EFFORTS TO AMEND
OR REPEAL THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, H. REP. No. 94-1738, Sept. 30, 1976; see also
FED. ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 42, at 705 (those who see the Act as overreaching
have proposed that the unlawful conduct must be narrowly defined and that the de-
fenses must be broadened to reflect market needs and business realities).
70. See Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 AN-ITrUST LJ. 18, 43 (1976).
71. See infa note 81 and accompanying text. It is the basic premise of the old
"Chicago" school of antitrust analysis that price discrimination promotes market effi-
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harmless law would be misleading since like all laws, it must be flexi-
ble in order to respond effectively to changing market conditions
and the growing concern for consumer welfare.
The Robinson-Patman Act begins with the premise that predatory
pricing can effectively eliminate those competitors who lack financial
support to withstand prolonged price competition. 72 The function
of the Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act is to prevent the
type of discriminatory pricing that has crippling effects on the com-
petition. 73 If this is accepted as a legitimate goal of antitrust policy,
then mere difficulty in interpretation or enforcement of the Robin-
son-Patman Act will not justify its repeal. The Robinson-Patman Act
does not address a "nonexistent threat to competition" as has been
ciency. See generally ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 6, at 116-33. While those adopt-
ing the Chicago school viewpoint argue that price discrimination necessarily
increases output, others are not persuaded. For example, in P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDA-
TION OF ECONOMIc ANALYSIS 42-44 (1947), the author suggests that "it cannot be
shown on a priori grounds that price discrimination necessarily increases output in
the direction of the competitive supply over that provided under a single price." Id.
72. As suggested by Shniderman, "the Act has its 'grass roots' in a feeling that
fairness in opportunity requires equality in pricing, unless there is justification for
departure." Shniderman, supra note 62, at 158.
73. Where a seller possesses monopoly power, the use of predatory pricing is a
potent tool for keeping out competition. Even in a highly competitive market, firms
with sufficient financial support can afford to use predatory pricing to maintain and
gain new markets. In the business world, this practice is known as "buying the mar-
ket." By its terms, it is a practice only available to financially powerful organizations,
but not necessarily the most efficient organizations in a given market. Smaller firms gener-
ally cannot afford such a practice, not because they are inefficient, but because they
lack the financial resources to withstand sustained predatory pricing competition.
Thus, the Robinson-Patman Act seeks "to protect the efficient competitor, not from
inefficiency but from power." COHEN, supra note 46, at 48.
To the extent that the Robinson-Patman Act seeks to protect small firms from
these practices, it should be vigorously enforced. In recent years it has been sug-
gested that certain products imported into the United States have been subsidized by
the governments of the exporting nations. The general objection to such subsidies
stems from the belief that, as a result of such subsidies these foreign firms are able to
sell in their target markets at levels considerably below cost. This, in turn, allows
these firms to acquire greater market shares (i.e., "buy the market"). As the volume
increases, the marginal cost of production decreases so that eventually they become
profitable. In addition, if such predatory practices are successful in lessening compe-
tition, the predator eventually will increase prices in order to recoup its previous
losses. The result is that other competitors who may be equally efficient, if not more
efficient, are kept out of the market. Proponents of regulation argue that such subsi-
dies constitute unfair methods of competition in violation of the Unfair Practices in
Import Trade Statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). It is this element of unfairness
that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits. The threat of eliminating or substantially
injuring firms which lack financial subsidies is quite real. Where there are substantial
barriers to entry into the particular market, the predator will enjoy increased sales
and profits by virtue of reduced competition. Even in a highly competitive market
with low entry barriers, there will be significant benefits to the predator.
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suggested by some commentators. 74 Rather, it is a law with the laud-
able purpose of preventing pricing practices which injure competi-
tion.75 While the Act may have appeared to be anti-competitive in
the past when it was narrowly interpreted, recent decisions by the
Commission and the courts have quite effectively dispelled that
notion.76
Recent decisions reflect a trend towards greater flexibility of the
Act through less restrictive application of the available defenses, par-
ticularly the meeting competition defense.77 In response to persis-
tent efforts of opponents to repeal or reform the Robinson-Patman
Act, 78 a House Committee on Small Business was formed in 1975 to
investigate the validity of these efforts and to recommend future di-
rections for the Act.79 The outcome of this investigation was the
Small Business Report,8 0 presented in 1976, which generated strong
support for the Act and its objectives, and called for greater
enforcement.81
74. See ANrrrriusT PARADOX, supra note 6, at 394.
75. "[T]he Sherman Act speaks of attempts to monopolize, while the Robinson-
Patman Act [speaks of conduct] aimed at lessening competition." Henry v. Chloride,
Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1345 (8th Cir. 1987).
76. These recent allegations are ill-timed. They come "at a time when the lower
federal courts, in an almost consistent line of decisions . . . have been adjudging
pricing practices challenged under either or both the Sherman and the Robinson-
Patman Acts under a standard which gives sellers greater leeway to practice competi-
tively without violating the Acts." MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 1-2.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (b) (1982).
78. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1975); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 461 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
79. AD HOC SUBCOMMrrTE ON ANTITRUST, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, AND RE-
LATED MAT-ERS OF THE COMMrTTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, RECENT EFFORTS TO AMEND
OR REPEAL THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, H. REP. No. 94-1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(Sept. 30, 1976).
80. Small Business Report, supra note 63.
81. The findings and conclusions of the Report read in part:
1. The Robinson-Patman Act, which is an important part of the antitrust
laws of the United States, should not be repealed nor emasculated nor weak-
ened in any manner whatsoever; neither should it be amended.
2. The Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is
possible, the interests of small business concerns in order to preserve free
competitive enterprise.
3. Regulation means supervisory control by an administrative body that
substitutes for the impersonal control of the free market. In that sense,
neither the Robinson-Patman Act nor other provisos of law making it illegal
to use price discriminatory acts or practices are regulation of business. The
Act is not a regulation. It "merely requires that business avoid such acts and
practices which restrain, injure, damage, or destroy small business through
price discriminatory practices, or tend to create a monopoly."
4. Certain special interests have mounted a strong and vigorous campaign,
and made erroneous charges to the effect that the [Act] impedes competi-
tion. Therefore, vigilance is needed and prompt action required to oppose
[Vol. 14
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Following the Small Business Report, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, in 1977, released a comprehensive analysis of
the Robinson-Patman Act.82 The Justice Report called for reform,
charging that the Act imposed great costs on society by encouraging
inefficiency.8
It is unlikely that the persistent calls for reform or repeal will suc-
ceed at this time, in light of the strong support for the Act from both
Congress and small businesses.84 In recent decisions, the Supreme
Court has called for the need to construe the Act "consistently with
these special interest groups and other individuals who would like to emas-
culate or even do away with such needed laws.
5. The allegations have had the ill effects of confusing citizens and govern-
mental officials and misleading them into the disbelief that those laws
against price discrimination practices are anticompetitive and undesirable
and should be repealed.
6. That the lobbying activities have had the unfortunate effect of persuad-
ing some officials to refrain from its full and complete enforcement with the
result that the Congressional intent is thwarted and a bureaucratic repeal
effected.
Id.
82. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 58.
83. The report criticized various aspects of the Act, alleging that it instills ex-
treme pricing caution in sellers and buyers, reduces pricing flexibility, discourages
the development of efficient distribution systems, and frequently operates to the det-
riment of consumers. Specifically, the report suggested that the Act reinforces price
rigidity and stability to the detriment of consumers or by:
a) discouraging pricing flexibility
b) encouraging exchanges of data and price fixing
c) allowing buyers to negotiate without restraint
d) restricting competition for new markets and customers
The report also suggested the Act fosters inefficient and costly distribution patterns
to the detriment of consumers and small business since it:
a) preserves inefficient distribution networks;
b) handicaps small retailers;
c) unduly burdens small business;
d) handicaps smaller retailers by restricting supplier ability to respond to
pricing challenges from the smaller businessman's competitors, the so-
called secondary line injury.
JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 58.
84. See FEDERAL ArrrITRUST LAw, supra note 42, at 705; see also Klein, Meeting Com-
petition by Pricing Systems Revisited: The Vanco Decision, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 795 (1983).
Recently, the Act's supporters have become more vocal:
Although compromise [pressures] may be exacted from time to time ...
the political and economic interests supporting price regulation are not only
sufficiently numerous and influential to forestall this event, but also can rally
behind what has become in financial and international trade circles an in-
creasingly respectable battle cry of a "level playing field" whose equitable
tenor further ensures the act's survival.
Id. at 821-22. As a result of several liberal court opinions in the past decade, there is
clearly a definite trend toward greater flexibility in both interpretation and applica-
tion and, consequently, further makes reform of the Act unlikely. Also, "The Act has
shown its capacity to survive attack or indeed amendment, no matter whether propo-
nents or opponents oppose change." Shniderman, supra note 62, at 158.
1988]
17
Nwaneri: The "Good Faith" Meeting Competition Defense to a Section 2(A) Vi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the broader policies of the antitrust laws." 8 5 At the same time, lower
federal courts have begun to apply more flexible standards.86 This
increased flexibility gives sellers greater leeway in pricing deci-
sions.87 The shift in the courts' position is mainly a response to the
trend toward greater consumer protection. No longer is it proper to
legislate laws that protect business at the expense of the individual
consumer. This change reflects not only a positive response to a
changing market system, but also a reaction to the continuing pres-
sures for reform. Thus, to the extent that the Robinson-Patman Act
sets limits on permissible pricing and challenges the seller's conduct
only where the potential for competitive injury exists, it should be
vigorously preserved. 88
II. MEETING COMPETITION THROUGH AREA-WIDE PRICING
Opinions differ as to whether or not the Robinson-Patman Act is
enforced too aggressively at the cost of greater business flexibility.89
Acceptance of area-wide pricing as a legitimate business response to
competition strikes a reasonable balance between these two goals.90
85. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979); see also
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 455 (1978).
86. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 1-2.
87. Id.
88. The House Subcommittee on Small Business in 1976 expressed concern over
the declining level of enforcements by the Commission in the 1970's compared to
prior years. H.R. Rep. No. 1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1976). This decline in
enforcement has been gradual but steady. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 41 n.158.
"[D]espite the FTC's periodic assertion that it will continue vigorously to enforce the
Act, FTC investigations have dropped off precipitously." Id. The Monograph pro-
vides a table of formal enforcement and complaints from 1965 to 1978. The table
shows that the number of complaints dropped sharply from 159 in 1967, to just 73 in
1968, to only four in 1977, and none in 1978. Over the same period, the number of
formal complaints dropped from 14 in 1968 to five in 1978. Id.
89. Halverson & Flexner, ABA Section of Antitrust Law Business Meeting, Introductory
Remarks, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1986). The authors discussed the justification for gov-
ernmental interference in pricing decisions:
[T]here are two basic ideas that are at issue. One holds that the consumer is
sovereign and that his interest and society's interest in allocating scarce re-
sources is best served by the interaction of supply and demand as regulated
only by the market price. The other idea does not necessarily quarrel with
the goals to be served by the market, but sees government as a more effi-
cient and a fairer system for ensuring the delivery of goods and services at -
the right price.
Id. at 173.
90. "As a result, there is no need to alter the meeting competition defense as it
has emerged over the years under the Robinson-Patman Act [since] decisions con-
struing the . . . defense have recognized business realities by giving preeminence to
the good faith aspects of competitive response." Henneberger & Fleischaker, Reform
of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Second Look, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 203, 225 (1976); see also
Kuenzel & Schiffres, Making Sense of Robinson-Patman: The Need to Revitalize its Affirma-
tive Defenses, 62 VA. L. REV. 1211 (1976). "As enacted [the meeting competition de-
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If the Act's purpose is preservation of the freedom to compete, then
both the courts and the Commission must be mindful that "[i]f the
search for certainty in the law produces a tendency toward rigidity in
the regulatory pattern, then the freedom, instead of being preserved,
might well be diminished." 9' Recognizing that flexibility is a neces-
sary condition for the preservation of the Act, the courts and the
Commission have now accepted that, under certain circumstances,
area-wide pricing can be the most reasonable method of meeting
competition.92
A. The Good Faith Requirement
The only question in any meeting competition defense is whether
the seller has acted in good faith in response to a competitive en-
croachment.93 Where a seller has good reasons to believe that a
competitor is charging lower prices throughout a particular region, it
must be allowed to respond accordingly.94 While "good faith" is not
defined by the Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has devel-
fense] embodies a workable compromise between the economic and antitrust rule of
competition, and the Robinson-Patman Act's concern for small independent busi-
nesses." Id. at 1255.
91. SAWYER, supra note 1, at 319.
92. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983). "Territorial
pricing can be a perfectly reasonable method of meeting competition, sometimes, the
most reasonable method of responding to rivals' low prices." Id. at 450. Cf. Mary-
land Baking v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (1957) (FTC permits competitive area pricing vari-
ations to avert placing prices in a straight-jacket throughout the country).
93. See E. CORWIN, D. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 565 (1959).
The good faith of the seller cannot be established where his purpose is to
eliminate competition by conspiracy or monopolization, to make an aggres-
sive attack on the business of competitors who can maintain their position
only through a price differential, or to modify the resale practices of the
favored customer .... The good or bad faith of a seller can be established
only after examination of a variety of circumstances as to the nature and
history of [the] practice, the setting in which it occurs, and [the] purposes.
Id. A seller must be cautious that the lower prices are offered only within the zone of
the competitor's prices and for the same duration as the competitor's offer. Accord
Falls City, 460 U.S. at 451-52. The lower prices must be limited to the group reason-
ably believed to have been offered the lower competitive prices. One choosing to
price on a territorial basis, rather than on a customer-by-customer basis, must show
that this decision was a genuine, reasonable response to prevailing competitive cir-
cumstances. Id. But see Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114 (1955) (rejecting the proposi-
tion that showing that the seller's discriminations were temporary and localized in area is
an indispensible prerequisite to the defense).
94. In such circumstances, customer-by-customer negotiations would be unlikely
to result in prices different from those set according to information relating to the
competitor's territorial prices. Furthermore, pricing on a customer-by-customer ba-
sis may be inefficient. In addition, individual response may be unrealistically expen-
sive and impractical under some circumstances. Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d
435, 442 (5th Cir. 1966).
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oped guidelines which now govern the good faith inquiry.95 Despite
these definitions, the good faith element of the meeting competition
defense has proved difficult to apply. 96 Thus far, no pattern has
emerged for determining whether a given conduct will satisfy the
section 2(b) good faith requirement. At best, some broad guidelines
may be constructed from past decisions.97 The question of whether
a given pricing response is valid remains a factual determination
based on the reasonableness of the conduct.98 The same is true for
area-wide pricing. Where there is reasonable proof from past con-
duct that a competitor is systematically going after a seller's market,
the seller should be free to defend its market by meeting the antici-
pated competition.99 Because good faith is a flexible and pragmatic
95. The standard was established in FTC v. Continental Baking Co., 62 F.T.C.
2071, 2163 (1963):
[A]t the heart of the section 2(b) defense is the concept of "good faith."
This is a flexible and pragmatic, not a technical or doctrinaire concept. The
standard of good faith is simply the standard of the prudent businessman
responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation of competitive
necessity.
Id.
96. Professor Edwards suggests that good faith of the seller in meeting competi-
tion is not a satisfactory basis for determining the relative importance of the values
that are to be reconciled. Rather than good faith, he suggests that the question
should center on the scope and character of injuries to competition resulting from
the discriminatory pricing. It is further suggested that while good faith may be an
appropriate basis for the determination of the impact on the seller's competition, it is
inappropriate in the measure of effect on buyers. See C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW 581 (1959). Proponents of the Act argue that the bail-out provi-
sions of the meeting competition defense unduly limits a plaintiff's cause of action.
See generally C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (2d rev. ed. 1959). While proof of good faith effectively re-
buts an inference of injury in such cases, it does not overcome an inference of injury
to competition between that customer and other customers. Id. at 95.
97. See infra notes 101-86 and accompanying text.
98. "The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the language of section
2(b) to require that defendant show only the existence of facts which would lead a
reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in
fact meet the equally low price of a competitor." FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 759-60 (1949); see also United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S.
422, 453 (1978) (a good faith belief rather than absolute certainty is sufficient to
satisfy the section 2(b) defense); Indian Coffee Corp. v. Folger Coffee Co., 1982-83
Trade Cas. (CCH) ch. 65,186 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd 817 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1985)
(courts focus is on good faith of the corporation).
99. Rose Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Chocolate Co., 816 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.
1987). "The [meeting competition] defense is designed to enable sellers to make
flexible responses to individual competitive situations; it is a rule of economic self-
defense which allows a seller to cut his price to one of his customers who is being
tempted by a competitor's low bid, without exposing him to Robinson-Patman liabil-
ity ...." Id. at 392.
"The defense expressly recognizes the need for a seller to adjust practices to
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concept, a case-by-case approach is almost inevitable.lOO
B. The Cases
In the years following the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act,
the FTC was expressly against the meeting competition defense.1Ol
The areawide/individual pricing dichotomy was first addressed by
the Supreme Court in the 1945 landmark case of FTC v. A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Co.l0 2 Staley was engaged in the manufacture of corn
syrup and in competition with Corn Products Refining Company.1OS
To increase its sales, Staley adopted Corn Product's base point price
system.104 Under this system, Staley sold its products at delivered
price based on Chicago plus freight.105 All customers were charged
freight from Chicago regardless of whether actual freight originated
from shipping points much closer to the buyer. Staley conceded that
its discriminatory freight charges were intended to meet the equally
discriminatory price of its principal competitor, Corn Products.106
The Commission believed the meeting competition defense was
not available to a seller who meets a competitor's pricing system,
without taking prior steps to verify competitors' prices, or who failed
to take precautions to prevent unwarranted discriminations in
price.10 7 The Supreme Court sustained the Commission's decision
particular competitive situations, and permits him flexibility to compete." Kitner,
Henneberger & Fleischaker, supra note 90, at 210.
100. See Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963) (the facts
and circumstances of the given case should govern application of the good faith re-
quirement of § 2 (b)).
101. Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Richard McLaren before the House Subcommit-
tee of the Regulatory Agencies relating to Small Business (reprinted in BNA ANTITRUST AND
TRADE REGULATION, REP. No. 453, Mar. 17, 1970, at X-4). "Regrettably the Commis-
sion in the past has attempted to impose limitations on the availablity of the defense
that are inconsistent with the broader antitrust goal of the promotion of competi-
tion." Id.
102. 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
103. Id. at 747-48.
104. Id. Under a single basing point system, the seller selects one place other than
its plant, usually the location of a large competitor's plant as its basing point. The
delivered price to any buyer is this base price, plus actual freight from the basing
point. See FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, supra note 42, at 169. "This system . . .has
potential anti-competitive effects. The equalization by a number of sellers of the
price facing any potential buyer has many of the characteristics of a price fixing car-
tel." Id. at 170.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes price fixing agreements unlawful per se.
Furthermore, "since such freight differentials bear no relation to the actual cost of
delivery, they are systematic discriminations prohibited by section 2(a) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act." Id. at 750-51; see also Corn Products v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945)
(decided the same day as Staley).
105. Staley, 324 U.S. at 749.
106. Id. at 750.
107. Id. at 759.
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and rejected Staley's meeting competition defense on the ground
that Staley established an artificially high price by adopting Corn
Product's prices.108 The Court stated: "We cannot say that a seller
acts in good faith when it chooses to adopt such a clearly discrimina-
tory pricing system, at least where it has never attempted to set up a non-
discriminatory system ... "109 The Court reasoned that in order to
establish the good faith meeting competition defense, the seller must
show the "existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and pru-
dent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in
fact meet the equally low price of a competitor."10 The Court
found that Staley adopted the pricing system without supporting evi-
dence and had made no effort to investigate or verify the existence of
the adopted price scheme.t I
The Court stated that the Act "places emphasis on individual com-
petitive situations, rather than upon a general system of competi-
tion."12 In the years following the Staley decision, this statement
was to become the source of much confusion, particularly in cases
involving area-wide pricing practices. It was interpreted by some
courts to imply that the meeting competition defense is available
only for customer-by-customer pricing schemes. 13 Other courts in-
terpreted the Court's language to allow area-wide pricing if good
faith can be established by the seller.t*4 The latter courts present
108. Id. at 756-57.
109. Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 759-60. This standard was later adopted by the FTC in In re Continen-
tal Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071 (1963) as "the standard of the prudent businessman
responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation of competitive
necessity."
111. Staley, 324 U.S. at 758-59. While the Commission recognized that section
2(b) did not place an impossible burden upon the seller, it does require a seller to
show the existence of good faith. Id. at 759. The Staley decision was based on a
finding that Staley adopted the discriminatory prices without good faith since it made
no attempt to verify the existence of any lower prices by its competitors. Id.
112. Id. at 753.
113. See, e.g., D.L. Ingram v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176, 184
(D.N.M. 1966) (refusing to grant the defense on the grounds that the defendant's
price reduction was more a part of a customary industry pricing system than an indi-
vidual meeting of competition); see also Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 360
F.2d 492, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (relying on Staley, held that the meeting competition
defense was applicable only in individual competitive situations rather than a general
system), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 959 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966); Standard
Motor Products, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1959) ("It is well settled that
a lowered price is within section 2 (b) only if it is made in response to an individual
competitive demand, and not as part of the seller's pricing system."), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 826 (1959).
114. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1046 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Bargain Car
Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163, 1176 (7th Cir. 1972); Callaway Mills
v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1966); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,
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the better reading of Staley.'15
The Fifth Circuit discussed the issue of area-wide pricing in some
detail in Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC.116 Callaway, a small textile manu-
facturing firm, had successfully adopted a method of carpet weaving
which was less expensive than traditional weaving methods.11 7 The
established selling mode in this industry was to offer volume dis-
counts. This meant that larger retailers obtained lower prices than
their smaller competitors.18 Originally, Callaway had refused vol-
ume discounts to its purchasers. Under pressure from its customers,
Callaway adopted a volume discount pricing schedule similar to that
offered by other manufacturers in the industry." t9 Since Callaway
sold in smaller volumes than its larger competitors, Callaway's dis-
counts were offered at lower dollar volumes.120 In 1959, the Com-
mission filed a complaint against Callaway alleging a violation of
section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act. 121 The hearing examiner found that Callaway had successfully
defended itself under section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act and
dismissed the complaint.I2 2 The Commission reversed on the
231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); Bergjans Farm
Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476, 487 (E.D. Mo, 1965), aff'd
368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966); see generally SHNIDERMAN & LEVERICH, PRICE DISCRIMI-
NATION IN PERSPECTIVE 159-65 (2d ed. 1987) (a good faith effort will not be disquali-
fied because price undercutting occurred).
115. See generally FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 42, at 417-18 (courts must
consider the rationale of the Staley rule and the practical alternatives available to
seller before simply condemning out of hand the adoption of a competitor's pricing
system).
116. 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966) (defense allowed where defendant granted a
volume discount, adopting a "formal pricing system" rather than meeting individual
competition).
117. See id. at 437.
118. See id. There were other facts peculiar to the carpet industry which the Court
considered relevant. For example, the carpet industry wished to discontinue the es-
tablished practice of granting volume discounts. The industry, through its national
association, had attempted to discontinue this pricing practice on an industry-wide
basis. That attempt resulted in a suit by the Justice Department which sought to
enjoin termination of the industry's discount system. The Justice Department al-
leged that termination of volume discounts on an industry-wide basis would consti-
tute collusion, conspiracy and an attempt to monopolize. As a result of the suit, a
consent decree was issued which prohibited the carpet industry from entering into
any agreements or conspiring to terminate volume allowances or rebates to purchas-
ers of rugs and carpet. Id.
119. See id. at 437-38.. Until 1955, Callaway's policy was to grant no volume dis-
counts. After the consent decree, the pressure from Callaway's customers increased
and lead to Callaway's decision to adopt the industry's volume discount pricing sys-
tem. Id.
120. See id. at 448.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 439. The meeting competition defense is an absolute defense which
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grounds that Callaway had adopted a formal pricing system instead
of meeting each individual competitive situation.t2s Callaway ap-
pealed the decision of the Commission.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals defined the issue on appeal as
whether Callaway's pricing was genuinely responsive to a competi-
tive price.124 The court concluded that in some circumstances, the
requirement of customer-by-customer pricing "would be burden-
some, unreasonable'and practically unfeasible."1 25 The court re-
jected the Commission's ruling that Callaway should have adopted a
policy of lowering prices on a piecemeal fashion. In doing so, the
court dismissed the Commissioner's conclusion that Callaway had
failed to show good faith by adopting a formal pricing system rather
than meeting each individual situation.126 The Court reasoned that
since the meeting competition defense is a factual determination, it
was error for the Commission to completely disregard the peculiari-
ties of the industry and the particular circumstances of the case.
127
The Callaway Court distinguished Staley on the grounds that Staley
involved a "basing-point" system128 which had the effect of creating
greater price discrimination than was necessary.' 29 In Callaway, the
court found that "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, the dis-
count system, thoughtfully tailored.., to meet.., problems in the market,
exonorates the seller of discriminatory pricing violations, even though the plaintiff
has shown competitive injury.
123. See Callaway, 362 F.2d at 429. The Commission also reversed the .hearing
examiner's opinion because Callaway (1) failed to show that its products were "like
grade and quality" as those of the competition and (2) that Callaway had actually
under cut the competition by granting discounts at lower volume levels. Id.
124. See id. at 442. The question is whether the volume discount pricing system is
thoughtfully tailored to meet individual competitive problems in the market. Id. "It
is only when no reasonable and prudent person would conclude that the adopted
system is a reasonable method of meeting the lower price of a competitor that it is
condemned." Id. at 442.
125. Id. This is especially true in a highly competitive market with many product
lines. The Court took the position that since Callaway was a very small firm and in
competition with larger firms, it would be unreasonable to require Callaway to re-
spond on a piecemeal basis as that would be too financially burdensome for Callaway.
Id. This opinion seems to imply that the financial ability of the seller is a considera-
tion in the determination of good faith. It can be further implied that a seller's good
faith may depend on its financial capabilities and its other resources.
126. See id. "There is nothing wrong per se with adopting a pricing system." Id, at
441.
127. Id. at 441-42; see also FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 518 (1963) (court
should consider individual circumstances of small gas stations who were hurt by gas
distributor's price break to a competitor).
128. Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442 ("Clearly this is not a basing-point case."); see also
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 42, at 415-16 (because no basing-point was
found, the Callaway court "upheld the adoption by one company of its competitor's
entire pricing system.").
129. See Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442.
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was a mature and reasonable approach to a very real and difficult
competitive problem . 3. 0."30
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit was presented with a similar problem in
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 131 involv-
ing the scope of permissible area-wide pricing. William Inglis was a
family owned wholesale bakery which manufactured and sold bread
and rolls in northern California.132 Inglis was in competition with
Continental, at the time one of the nation's largest wholesale baker-
ies.t13 Both firms sold their bread under an "advertised". label and a
"private" label.134
In its suit, Inglis alleged that Continental sought to eliminate com-
petition in the northern California market by charging below cost
prices for its "private" label.135 It further alleged that Continental's
predatory pricing was in response to a declining "advertised" label
market resulting from the growing "private" label market in the re-
gion.136 Inglis alleged that Continental embarked on this discrimi-
natory pricing practice for the purpose of "eliminating independent
wholesalers like Inglis who were financially less capable of with-
standing a price war."'a7 William Inglis' final allegation was that
Continental's ultimate goal was to use its enhanced market power to
improve its market position by later raising its private label prices to
ultimately improve the competitive position of its "advertised" la-
bel.138 Inglis attempted to show that its demise was not the result of
honest competition but rather the result of "unfair predatory tactics
130. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court also introduced another element by
holding that under the circumstances of the case, Callaway could in good faith at-
tempt to meet competition by granting similar volume discounts especially since no
workable alternative was evident. Id.
In subsequent years the Fifth Circuit reached two conflicting results in seemingly
similar situations. Compare Surprise Brassiere Co., Inc. v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711 (5th Cir.
1969) (rejecting the defense) with Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Industries, Inc.,
482 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding the defense), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136
(1974). It has been suggested however, that these two decisions are in fact, consis-
tent with Callaway if the true test of "whether a reasonable businessman would con-
clude that such a response was a reasonable method of meeting the competitive
price," is applied. MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 127.
131. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
132. See id. at 1024.
133. See id.
134. See id. "Private" label bread was manufactured on behalf of retailers and
marketed under the retailer's label. The principal difference between "private" and
"advertised" labels is that "private" labels are lower priced and thus have lower
profit margins. Id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1024-25.
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adopted by a [competitor's] intent to monopolize the market."13 9
Similar to the Fifth Circuit in Callaway, the Ninth Circuit held that the
meeting competition defense applies to territorial pricing in the
same way that the defense applies to individual pricing, as long as
the area-wide price is "coextensive with the price competition to be
met."14o
The Inglis court adopted the view that area-wide pricing was per-
missible as long as it was not used to aggressively reduce prices to
other customers in the area.141 Consequently, the Inglis court held
that area-wide pricing must be narrowly tailored so that the reduced
prices are available only in the area where the competitor's prices are
reasonably believed to exist. 142
The permissible scope of the Callaway "reasonable and prudent"
test, although narrowed by Inglis, was once again expanded by the
Supreme Court in Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc. 143
The seller, Falls City Industries, operated a brewery in Louisville,
Kentucky, from which it sold beer to wholesalers in Indiana, Ken-
tucky, and eleven other states. Vanco Beverages, one of Falls City's
wholesalers, brought an action alleging that Falls City charged
higher prices to its wholesalers in Indiana that it did to those in Ken-
tucky. Falls City defended its higher Indiana prices by pointing out
that its Indiana prices were offered in an attempt to meet its competi-
tors' lower prices in Indiana.144
The Supreme Court held that the meeting competition defense is
139. See id. at 1026.
140. Id. at 1045.
141. Id. "Market-wide price reductions are not necessarily fatal to the defense of
meeting competition in price discrimination actions." Id. Rather, the 2(b) defense
(the meeting competition defense) "permits justification of seller's lower prices
which are granted not only to particular customers .... but which respond in a given
area by blanket price reductions co-extensive with the price competition to be met."
Id. A seller may not, however, embark in area-wide pricing unless it has a reasonable
basis to believe that the competitor is making the lower prices available throughout
the entire market. Id. at 1046.
142. Id. ("the price competition zone cannot be perceived to be smaller than the
zone of price reduction"). The permissible price competition zone is that defined by
the competitor's low prices. This standard on its face would seem to put a high bur-
den of proof on the seller wishing to meet competition in an area-wide basis by re-
quiring that it have actual knowledge of the number of customers being enticed with
the lower prices. However, the court went on to state that absolute certainty is not
required. Rather, the seller needs only a "reasonable basis to believe that equally
low offers are available . . . throughout the market." Id.; accord United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 453 (1978), appeal after remand 600 F.2d 414
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979) (seller must have a reasonable basis
for its determination of both the existence of the lower price and the geographic size
of the competitive zone).
143. 460 U.S. 428 (1983).
144. See id. at 434.
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not defeated merely because the seller responds with area-wide pric-
ing rather than on a customer-by-customer basis.145 As a result, the
Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the defense of
section 2(b) is available only in individual pricing situations. The
Court refused to construe the 2(b) defense as narrowly as the Sev-
enth Circuit, instead applying a "prudent businessman" standard. 146
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that such a requirement would be
too expensive for smaller firms such as Falls City. 147 The Court dis-
tinguished Staley on the grounds that in Staley, the seller was involved
in illegal, interseller conspiracy and collusion.148 Applying the good
faith standard developed in Staley, the Court held that the facts and
circumstances of this case were different from Staley because unlike
Staley, Falls City did not adopt an illegal system of prices.149
In the more recent decision of Rose Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Choc-
olate Co.,150 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated that the
145. Id. at 448. The Court stated "there is no evidence that Congress intended to
limit the availability of Section 2(b) to customer-specific responses." Id. Rather,
Congress intended to allow reasonable pricing responses in area-specific cases where
competitive circumstances warrant them. The Court went on to conclude that "Con-
gress did not intend to bar territorial price differences that are in fact responses to
competitive conditions." Id.
146. Falls City, 654 F.2d 1224, 1230 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 428, 438
(1983). "This Court consistently has held that the meeting-competition defense 'at
least requires the seller who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show the exist-
ence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the
granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor.'"
Id. (quoting FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945)).
The Court rejected the rule requiring customer-specific responses which had
been applied in Exquisite Form Brassiere, 360 F.2d at 493 and Standard Motor Products,
265 F.2d at 677, holding instead that the seller must be allowed to show that its
territorial pricing system was a genuine, reasonable response to prevailing competi-
tive circumstances. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 450 ("We choose not to read into Section
2(b) a restriction that would deny the meeting-competition defense to one whose
area wide price is a well-tailored response to competitors' low prices.").
147. Id. at 449; accord Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442. But see F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371
U.S. 505, 513 n.8 (1963) (holding size of buyer irrelevant).
148. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 441. First, at the time, Staley had been found to be a
party to an interseller conspiracy aimed at maintaining "oppressive and uniform net
delivered prices" throughout the country. Second, Staley could not claim that its low
Chicago prices were set for the purpose of meeting competition there, thus "the Chi-
cago prices could be seen only as a collusive pricing system designed to exact artifi-
cially high prices throughout the country." Id. As a result, the Court, in Staley,
sustained the FTC's finding that respondent's price discriminations were not made in
good faith. Thus, Staley was based on a finding of lack of good faith. Falls City, 460
U.S. at 442 (the court distinguished Falls City's pricing practices from the collusive
pricing scheme found in Staley).
149. Id. The Court stated that "[i]f Falls City set its lower price in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor, it did not violate the Robinson-Patman
Act." Id.
150. 816 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1987).
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meeting competition defense is a "fact-specific inquiry"151 which
may be satisfied by "any proof demonstrating that a reasonable per-
son would have believed that a low-price offer was available to the
favored purchaser."152
Rose Confections (Rose) was a Minnesota-based firm engaged in
the business of rebagging chocolate chips.153 Ambrosia, a Milwau-
kee-based firm and the nation's largest manufacturer of cocoa-based
products, was Rose's principal supplier.154 Facing a difficult compet-
itive situation on the West Coast, Ambrosia instituted its so-called
"West Coast project."155 Under this plan, Ambrosia would sell
chocolate chips to its West Coast customers at the same price it
charged other buyers, but it would deliver the products free of
charge to the customers' West Coast facilities.156 This offer of free
delivery was only extended to its West Coast customers.1
5 7
In 1981, Ambrosia made a proposal to Barge & Foster (Barge), a
Milwaukee-based company, and Rose's primary competitor.t58
Under the terms of the proposal, Barge would build a plant on the
West Coast and Ambrosia would sell chips to Barge freight-free.59
Barge accepted the offer and pursuant to the "West Coast project"
agreement, built a rebagging facility in Sparks, Nevada.160 Between
1981 and 1983, under this agreement Barge took delivery of more
than five million pounds of freight-free chips for a total savings of
almost $310,000.161 Ambrosia did not make a similar offer to
Rose.16 2 Rose brought this action against Ambrosia under the
Robinson-Patman Act on the grounds that the free-freight arrange-
ment was an illegal price discrimination that injured Rose in the
West Coast market.163 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Rose
and Ambrosia appealed.164
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Callaway decision, stating that
"[iut is possible that a general pricing policy spanning several differ-
ent markets in a certain region could be a good-faith response to
151. Id. at 390 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
455 (1978)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 384.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 384-85.
161. Id. at 385.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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competition in each of the markets in that region."1 65 Defendants
must still show, however, that such pricing, if found to be discrimina-
tory, was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor. 166
In Rose, it was found that the pricing policy was not made in re-
sponse to a good faith belief of lower prices from competition, but
rather was an independent decision specifically to have such a pric-
ing policy without regard to any particular competition.167 The facts
showed that Rose was having difficulty competing on the West Coast.
Its major competitors in the west had their manufacturing facilities
on the West Coast and therefore could offer lower prices to rebag-
gers because of low freight charges.168 Thus, the "West Coast pro-
ject" was not designed with any particular competitor in mind.
Rather, it was a business plan designed to improve market standing
on the West Coast in general. While such a plan is not per se illegal,
Ambrosia's failure to make the "West Coast project" available to
other purchasers similarly situated and in competition with Barge
placed this pricing decision beyond the reach of the meeting compe-
tition defense.
In another recent decision, Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,169 the Fed-
eral Trade Commission was faced with the issue of whether an area-
wide pricing response in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act was a
bar to the meeting competition defense.70 Boise was a firm en-
gaged principally in the manufacture, distribution and sale of office
products which consist mainly of paper, packaging, office supplies,
wood products, and building materials.171 Boise entered the busi-
ness of distributing office products through their acquisition of Asso-
ciated Stationers Company in 1964. Subsequently, Boise operated
as a dual distributor, selling both to office products dealers and end-
165. Id. at 392.
166. Id.
167. The Eighth Circuit held that Ambrosia's pricing strategy in the West Coast
was not defensive but rather offensive. The court found that Ambrosia could not
have had a good faith belief that it was meeting competitors' low prices. Id. It con-
cluded that the "project was a strategy to increase sales ... on the West Coast ....
While this may be a laudable corporate policy .... it does not square with the defense
of meeting competition as envisioned by Congress and interpreted by the Supreme
Court." Id. at 391-92.
168. Id. at 389.
169. 107 F.T.C. 76 (1986) (because the required injury to competition was miss-
ing, the meeting competition defense was not addressed), rev'd on other grounds, 837
F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
170. Boise, 837 F.2d at 1130. The major issue presented in Boise involved the
buyer's liability for inducing the seller to offer discriminatory prices in violation of
section 13(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
171. Id. at 1137-38.
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users. 172 Because of this dual distributor status, Boise was able to
receive lower prices than did other retailers with whom it com-
peted.' 73 The Commission brought this action alleging that Boise
illegally induced favorable prices from manufacturers in violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act.174 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed on the grounds that the Commission's allega-
tions of competitive injury was not supported by the evidence. The
requisite element of competitive injury was found to be missing by
the court, and thus it did not reach the issue of availability of the
meeting-competition defense.175
The Commission in Boise did not expressly rule area-wide pricing
illegal per se. It found, however, that the facts taken together did not
appear to support a good faith response to particular competitive
circumstances.176 The Commission reasoned that even if the area-
wide prices were offered in order to meet competition, proof was still
needed that Boise had verified the existence of lower competitive of-
fers.177 In Boise, the requisite good faith was found missing.178 The
Boise decision reinforced the idea that the predominant consideration
in determining the validity of a pricing response is the good faith
standard. The test is the same regardless of the method of pricing
employed.
In summary, these recent cases make it clear that area-wide pricing
is now generally allowed under appropriate circumstances.t79 In
172. Id. at 1133-34.
173. Id. at 1134.
174. Id. at 1130.
175. Id. at 1148.
176. Id. at 1137.
177. Id.
178. The decisive facts in Boise were as follows:
1. Boise knew of the systematic nature of the discounts, id. at 1134.
2. Its employees knew it received the discounts because it had been classified
as a wholesaler, Id. at 1135-35;
3. Boise offered no evidence that its discounts were responsive to lower com-
petitive offers, id.;
4. Boise knew that wholesaler discounts were not available to dealers with
which it competed in the retail market, id. at 1135;
5. Boise was positioned to know if the price was to meet a competing seller's
price or not and, Boise, a sophisticated buyer might be presumed to be capable
and held to know. Id. at 1135-36.
Given these facts, the Commission found that the inference of lack of good faith was
not unreasonable, so that it was not necessary to obtain a direct confession from
Boise. Id. at
179. Indian Coffee Corp. v. Folger Coffee Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65186 (W.D.
Pa. 1982) (general pricing is not precluded by section 13(b)); William Inglis, 668 F.2d
at 1014 (prevailing industry practice made area-wide response reasonable and pru-
dent; area-wide pricing is permissible where there is reasonable basis for the belief);
Callaway, 362 F.2d at 435 (there is nothing wrong per se with adopting a pricing
system; court must look at the realities of the competitive conditions prevalent in the
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area-wide pricing, as in every discriminatory pricing situation in
which competitive injury is shown, there is a rebuttable presumption
of lack of good faith.180 The burden of proof is on the challenging
party to show competitive injury or facts from which such injury may
be inferred.181 Once shown, the burden shifts to the challenged
party to show absence of competitive injury.18 2
If the plaintiff is able to establish competitive injury, the defendant
must show justifications for its conduct. Thus, there is an additional
burden of proof on the challenged party to show evidence of good
faith. 183 Once shown, it is a complete defense regardless of its effect
on competition.184 The quantum of proof necessary to satisfy this
burden depends on the particular circumstances of each case. His-
torically, area-wide pricing has required a higher level of proof than
individual pricing responses.' 8 5 This bifurcation in standards was
due in part to the various judicial interpretations of the Supreme
Court's decision in Staley which appeared to limit the meeting com-
petition defense to individual pricing responses.' 8 6
The issue seems to have been settled. Now, the generally accepted
particular industry or market.); accord Surprise Brassiere Co. v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711
(5th Cir. 1969).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) provides that once price discrimination is shown there is a
prima facie case which places a rebuttable presumption on the defendant to demon-
strate good faith. See SHNIDERMAN & LEVERICH, supra note 114, at 141; Accord Morton
Salt, 334 U.S. at 50-51 (competitive injury is presumed whenever there is substantial
price discrepancy over a sustained period of time).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982). Cf. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 434-35 (burden of proof
may be satisfied by showing a reasonable possibility of injury to competition).
182. Id.
183. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982), reads in part or as
follows:,
Upon proof being made.. . that there has been discrimination in price...
the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing justifica-
tion shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section ....
Id.
184. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), rev'd, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
185. See Klein, Meeting Competition by Price Systems Under Section 2(b) of the Robinson-
Patman Act: Problems and Prospects, 16 ANTrrRUST BULL. 213 (1971).
Although the proviso makes no distinction, in practice the Courts and the
Federal Trade Commission have treated sellers responding in ad hoc fash-
ion differently from those who attempt to project a response to a compre-
hensive market situation in a pre-planned manner.
Id. at 213; see also McCareins, New Dimensions in the Robinson-Patman Act after Vanco
Beverage, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1308.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in [Falls City], the section 2(b) defense
and the [A.E. Staley] reasonable and prudent standard were applied more
strictly when seller responded to a competitor's area-wide price reduction
than when a seller met competition on a one-on-one basis.
Id. at 1320-21; see also SHNIDERMAN & LEVERICH, supra note 114, at 147.
186. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
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reading of Staley is that its holding must be limited to situations
where the seller adopts its competitor's illegal pricing system without
first attempting to establish a non-discriminatory system. The cur-
rent view is that area-wide pricing is a viable method of meeting
competition under appropriate circumstances, as long as the deci-
sion is reasonable and prudent.
C. The Future of Area-Wide Pricing
The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions that the Sec-
tion 2(b) defense was not intended as an obstacle to competition.
Where area-wide pricing is truly made in response to the competitive
prices of rivals, the Court has generally allowed the defense.187 The
seller must, however, limit its lower price to that group of customers
reasonably believed to have the lower price available to it from com-
petitors. 188 This interpretation merely imposes the burden of proof
on the seller asserting the defense in an area-wide pricing situation
to show that the chosen method was "a genuine, reasonable re-
sponse to prevailing competitive circumstances."'89
Historically, application of the meeting competition defense was
presumed limited to individual competition.90 As a result, area-
wide pricing has been viewed as presumptively suspect.toi Even in
recent decisions which have tended to apply more flexible standards
187. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 450.
Territorial pricing, however, can be a perfectly reasonable method - some-
times the most reasonable method of responding to a rival's low prices. We
choose not to read into section 2(b) a restiction that would deny the meeting
competition defense to one whose area-wide price is a well-tailored re-
sponse to competitor's low prices.
Id.
188. Willam Inglis, 668 F.2d 1014, 1045 (1981). Otherwise, the seller would not
meet the required standard of good faith. Cf Falls City, 460 U.S. at 448-49 (seller
does not have to match the group of customers exactly as long as the it acts under a
reasonable belief that the lower price was available to the entire group of customers).
189. Id. at 450-51 (citing International Air), 517 F.2d at 725-26; accord Callaway, 362
F.2d at 441-42.
[T]his burden will be discharged by showing that a reasonable and prudent
businessman would believe that the price charged was generally available
from his competitors throughout the territory and throughout the period in
which [it] made the lower price available.
Falls City, 460 U.S. at 451 (citing William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1045-46).
190. Staley, 324 U.S. at 753.
[Section] 2(b) does not concern itself with pricing systems or even with all
the seller's discriminatory prices to buyers. It speaks only of the seller's
"lower" price and of that only to the extent that it is made "in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor." The Act thus places emphasis on
individual competitive situations rather than upon a general system of competition.
Id. (emphasis added).
191. See SHNIDERMAN & LEVERICH, supra note 114, at 147 (pricing systems viewed
as violative of good faith).
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to the meeting competition defense, such pricing practices are still
generally subjected to a higher level of scrutiny than is applied to
individual pricing situations.192
In more recent decisions, federal courts have relaxed the stan-
dards. It is now generally accepted that to meet the requirements of
the meeting competition defense, the seller need only show that the
decision to choose territorial pricing rather than customer-specific
pricing was a genuine and reasonable response to prevailing compet-
itive circumstances.193 The defense merely requires the seller to
show that the lower price would meet the equally low price of a com-
petitor.194 The standard governing good faith remains the standard
of a prudent businessperson responding fairly to what is reasonably
believed to be a situation of competitive necessity.195
These recent interpretations of the meeting competition defense
indicate a recognition by both the Commission and the courts that
flexibility will temper the anti-competitive stigma that has sur-
rounded the Robinson-Patman Act. Flexible application of the meet-
ing competition defense further reflects the recognition that the
Robinson-Patman Act was not designed to discourage market intelli-
gence, 196 but rather to protect competition. Valid area-wide pricing
192. In Falls City, Justice Blackmun asserted that industry-wide price discrimina-
tion within a geographic market should signal to a court that a substantial possibility
of collusion exists. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 443; see generally Note, Antitrust Laws -
Robinson-Patman Act - Harm to Competition - Meeting Competition Defense, 22 DUQ. L.
REV. 207 (1983).
193. "Although pricing systems have been viewed as collusive in nature and thus
violative of the good faith requirement, a buyer [sic] can demonstrate a valid meeting
competition defense when prices are not customer-specific if he proves that the sys-
tem was actually responsive to a competitive situation." SHNIDERMAN & LEVERICH,
supra note 114, at 147.
194. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 439-41.
195. This was the standard established in FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S.
746 (1945).
[T]he statute at least requires the seller, who has knowingly discriminated in
price, to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and pru-
dent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet
the equally low price of a competitor.
Id. at 759-60. Applying this standard in Falls City, the Supreme Court held that area-
wide pricing is permissible where it can be established that the seller in good faith
reasonably believes that a competitor's lower price is generally available in a given
region. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 451.
196. That this was not the intent is best shown by the language of the Supreme
Court in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1950):
Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish compe-
tition or so radically to curtail it that a seller would have no substantial right
of self-defense against a price raid by a competitor. For example, if a large
customer requests his seller to meet a temptingly lower price offered to him
by one of his seller's competitors, the seller may well find it essential, as a
matter of business survival, to meet that price rather than to lose the cus-
tomer .... There is nothing to show a congressional purpose, in such a
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is a self-defense mechanism used to keep competitors away from a
seller's customer base. For a small firm, time and financial con-
straints may make the piecemeal approach impractical, such that any
legal constraints under such circumstances could force the seller out
of the given market. On the other hand, the Act was not intended to
strip large sellers of their right to defend their markets.' 97 Absent
the flexibility to respond to changing market conditions, competition
will be hampered to the detriment of the consumer. It is precisely
this environment of healthy competition that the Sherman Act was
designed to enforce, and the Robinson-Patman Act, to control.
Therefore, flexible application of the meeting competition defense is
essential to minimize any anti-competitive effects, and will lead to
greater acceptance of the Robinson-Patman Act. 198
III. AREA-WIDE PRICING: EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS
The nature of the congressional draftsmanship, coupled with the
myriad of situations to which the language of the Robinson-Patman
Act must be applied, make unrealistic any expectations of a mechan-
istic formula to resolve issues of meeting competition through area-
wide pricing. This difficulty, however, does not pretermit an attempt
at setting forth guidelines for the analysis and interpretation of sec-
tion 2 cases.
From the decided cases, it is clear that the seller who seeks to in-
voke the meeting competition defense for a violation of Section 2(a)
has the burden of establishing that the price discrimination was a
good faith response to competition.199 An examination of Staley and
its progeny reveals several elements necessary for an area-wide pric-
ing scheme to be deemed valid.
The quantum of proof required to meet this burden may vary, de-
pending on several factors. This section examines the various evi-
dentiary concerns raised in any given Robinson-Patman price
discrimination action. These requirements occur at two levels. At
situation, to compel the seller to choose only between ruinously cutting its
prices to all its customers to match the price offered to one, or refusing to
meet the competition and then ruinously raising its prices to its remaining
customers to cover increased unit costs.
Id. at 249-50.
197. Id.
198. See SAWYER, supra note 1, at 319.
199. Section 2(b) provides in part:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section,
that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished,
the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing justifica-
tion shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and
unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is author-
ized to issue an order terminating the discrimination.
15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982).
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the first level are those elements which are required at the initial
stage to either establish competitive injury or the lack thereof. At the
second level are those factors which address the existence or lack of
justifications for the defendant's conduct once competitive injury is
established. Where the defendant has engaged in area-wide pricing
which is later shown to have injured competition, the defendant has
the burden of producing evidence of factors relevant in the determi-
nation of whether or not the meeting competition defense is avail-
able. Thus, any acceptable area-wide pricing system must be
designed with these considerations in mind. Taken individually,
none is dispositive. The weight of the various factors is determined
by the special circumstances of each case. 200
The impact of any alleged conduct on competition is determined
by comparing the competitive stance of the market subsequent to the
alleged conduct with the market condition in the period prior to the
defendant's conduct. As a result, the plaintiff's preliminary hurdle in
any Robinson-Patman price discrimination action must begin with
the definition of the relevant market. Only after the market is de-
fined may the plaintiff proceed to establish the extent to which com-
petition has been injured.20t Generally, the market is defined by
such factors as the product characteristics, 202 customer characteris-
tics, 20 3 the number of competitors,204 and the competitive struc-
ture. 205 Other factors relevant to market definition include the
degree of customer loyalty and the level of customer reliance on the
expertise of the sales force.206 Another factor relevant to the ques-
tion of comparative injury is the level of entry barriers,207 which in
turn are defined by the market characteristics.
200. The good faith requirement of section 2(b) cannot be determined by applica-
tion of rigid and inflexible rules, but rather, "the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case, not abstract theories or remote conjectures, should govern its
interpretation and application. Thus, the same method of meeting competition may
be consistent with an inference of good faith in some circumstances, inconsistent
with such an inference in others." Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 63 F.T.C. 2071,
2163 (1963). Cf. Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir.
1972) (a non-collusive system may qualify as a defense upon full examination of all
relevant background factors).
201. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1341-42.
202. Id. at 1342 (product characteristics include interchangeability and cross-elas-
ticity of demand).
203. Id.
204. Lomar Wholesale Grocery v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 587,
596-97 (8th Cir. 1987); William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1046-47.
205. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 599; Richard Short Oil Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 799 F.2d
415, 420 (8th Cir. 1986).
206. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 597.
207. Entry barriers are those factors which protect the given market from outside
competition. They include such factors as capital requirements, customer loyalty,
cross-elasticity of demand and customer reliance on salespersons. Id.
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A. Level I
Once the relevant market is defined, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to present evidence of injury to competition of the type pro-
hibited by the Robinson-Patman Act.208 To do this, the plaintiff
must "either show substantial possibility of injury to competition by
market analysis, or show injury to a competitor, accompanied by predatory
intent."209
1. Market Analysis
The structure of the market becomes relevant in the determination
of whether the defendant's conduct has caused competitive injury.
In a market characterized by intense competition, for example, the
plaintiff's burden of proof in showing market injury is quite
weighty.210 On the other hand, where there are few competitors, in-
jury to one may be sufficient to establish the requisite competitive
injury.211 In a highly competitive market characterized by many
competitors, the plaintiff may be required to show injury to a sub-
stantial number of the competitors in order to successfully carry its
burden. This is particularly the case where there are few or no sig-
nificant barriers to entry.2 12 Generally, the fewer the number of
players affected, the higher the requirement of predatory intent.213
Other factors that may indicate competitive injury include evidence
of a drastically declining price structure, 21 4 and increasing market
concentration.215 In Lomar, the circuit court held that evidence of an
208. Note, however, that competitive injury under Robinson-Patman embraces a
broader concept. Boise, 837 F.2d at 1139 n.12. It "does not require that the discrimi-
nations must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable
possibility that they 'may' have such an effect." Id. (citing Corn Products Refining
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945)); see also Falls City, 460 U.S. at 434-35 (to estab-
lish competitive injury under the Robinson-Patman Act, a plaintiff need only show a
reasonable possibility of harm to competition).
209. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1341 (emphasis added); accord Lomar, 824 F.2d at 596.
210. Thus, in Boise, where the office products industry was found to be highly
competitive, plaintiff had the burden of showing a general market failure affecting a
large number of competitors. Boise, 837 F.2d at 1135.
211. However, many courts place an additional burden on the plaintiff, even
under such circumstances, to show evidence of predatory intent. Henry, 809 F.2d at
1341.
212. "If entry barriers to new firms are not significant, the elimination of the com-
petitor may not significantly affect competition as a whole, because a new firm or
firms easily can enter the market to take the place of the old one." Lomar, 824 F.2d at
597.
213. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1335 (plaintiff must show substantial injury to market). Cf.
William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1047-48.
214. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 598; Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S.
685, 703 (1967).
215. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 703.
[Vol. 14
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss4/4
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT & AREA-WIDE PRICING
increase in the plaintiff's sales volume over the same period was not
consistent with the lower court's finding of competitive injury.2 16
Generally, evidence of the existence of factors other than the al-
leged price discrimination, which may reasonably be expected to
cause similar injury, will rebut the plaintiff's attempt to show injury.
Similarly, evidence that the plaintiff was losing sales in markets other
than the present market may be sufficient to rebut an inference of
competitive injury. Thus, in Boise, the defendant presented evidence
showing that the plaintiff's loss of accounts was the result of a shift
of sales representatives and not the result of price discrimination.217
The defendant may also rebut an inference of competitiive injury by
presenting evidence of competitive health in the market during the
period of discriminatory pricing. In Boise, evidence of a flourishing
industry and a steady rise in the number of dealers indicated an ab-
sence of anti-competitive forces.2i8
Thus, a defendant engaged in area-wide price discrimination may
quell an action under Section 2(a) by convincing the court there has
been no injury to competition of the type prohibited by the Act. It
may do this by having adequate knowledge of its industry from which
it may present rebuttal evidence of the kind discussed above. Since
prudent business decisions are normally supported by such market
information, this requirement places no additional burden on the
diligent seller. Knowledge of the importance of such information in
the event of a Section 2(b) defense may increase the diligence with
which such records are collected and maintained. Comprehensive
market research and analysis is not only good business practice, it is
legally necessary in the event of a Robinson-Patman price discrimi-
nation action. As stated above, this necessity is heightened where
the defendant engages in area-wide pricing practices.
2. Injury to Competitors Plus Predatory Intent
The threshold question in any Robinson-Patman price discrimina-
tion action is whether the plaintiff is "a casualty of vigorous, but hon-
est, competition, or the victim of unfair and predatory tactics
adopted by a company intent on monopolizing the market." 219 The
courts have consistently stated that absent a clear showing of com-
216. This is particularly so where plaintiff claimed to be defendent's only competi-
tor. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 598 (citing Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 179 and n.12
(5th Cir. 1967)). However, evidence of increased sales volume will not always pre-
clude a finding of injury. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 597; accord Rose Confections, Inc. v.
Ambrosia Chocolate Co., 816 F.2d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Utah Pie, 386 U.S.
at 702).
217. Boise Cascade Corp., 837 F.2d at 1136.
218. Id. at 1135 (testimony of Boise's expert witness, Dr. Kenneth Elzinga, Profes-
sor of Economics at the University of Virginia).
219. William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1026.
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petitive injury by market analysis, the plaintiff, in addition to showing
individual injury, must show causation.220 Causation may be in-
ferred from the fact that one competitor is paying more for the prod-
uct than another.221 This inference may be rebutted, however, by
evidence of other factors which could reasonably have caused the al-
leged injury. To accomplish this, the defendant must show that its
conduct was merely coincidental and did not contribute to the plain-
tiff's demise.222 For example, in Short, the defendant presented evi-
dence of other factors such as "mismanagement" and various
"questionable business practices" which it alleged led to the
injury.223
The Supreme Court, in Falls City, held that evidence of competitive
injury may be either direct or by inference and circumstantial evi-
dence.224 Under Morton Salt, a presumption of competitive injury ex-
ists whenever there is a substantial price discrepancy between the
favored purchaser and the other purchasers existing over a sustained
period of time.22 5 While the Morton Salt inference is still the law,
recent court decisions seem to have reduced the weight of this infer-
ence. For example, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Boise held that while the presence of such discrimina-
tions is indicative of competitive injury, it is rebuttable by evidence
that no detrimental impact resulted from the alleged price
discrimination.226
Assuming the plaintiff is able to show individual competitive injury
either by direct evidence or by inference, it must, in addition, show
that the defendant acted with the actual intent to lessen competition.
Again, to show intent the plaintiff may present either direct evidence
220. See, e.g., Short, 799 F.2d at 421.
221. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948); accord Boise, 837 F.2d at
1139 (weight of inference downplayed, however, since it was not a typical Robinson-
Patman Act case and court was reluctant to invoke the full strength of Morton Salt
inference).
222. Specifically, such inferences "may be overcome by evidence breaking the
causal connection between a price differential and lost sales of profits." Falls City,
460 U.S. at 435; accord Short, 799 F.2d at 421.
223. Short, 799 F.2d at 421. Cf. American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191
F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951). "We think there were too many factors bearing upon the
decline in the plaintiff's earning power to justify blaming it upon the trade practices
of defendant." Id. at 60. But see Rose, 816 F.2d at 387 (once competitive injury is
shown where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition, the mere fact that
other factors exist which may have had the same effect on competition is irrelevant).
224. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 435, citing Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 46, 50-51. Competi-
tive injury may be inferred from evidence of substantial price discrimination existing
over time.
225. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 46, 50-51.
226. Boise, 837 F.2d at 1137. The Commission recognized the rebuttable nature
of the Morton Salt inference, but nonetheless failed to give much weight to Boise's
evidence of a healthy industry and absence of lost sales.
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or circumstantial evidence or inferences drawn from the defendant's
conduct. 227
Determining what motivates the parties to any transaction is a diffi-
cult undertaking. Rules making motive relevant tend to encourage
deceit and are frequently misleading. 228 A better alternative would
be an inquiry into the rationality of the transaction.229 The question
would then become whether or not a rational businessperson under
similar circumstances would have entered into the given transac-
tion.230 Applying this rule, one could safely conclude that a rational
businessperson is unlikely to price goods below the average variable
cost over a long period of time when there are more profitable pric-
ing schemes available. Discriminatory intent could then be inferred
from such conduct. 23 1
The Federal Trade Commission and several courts have accepted
this "rational-economic-conduct rule," and have adopted the aver-
age variable cost as one basis for evaluating a defendant's pricing
227. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1344.
228. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw - AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190 (1976).
"Any doctrine that relies upon proof of intent is going to be applied erratically at
best." William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028. The Eighth Circuit "is among those [courts]
that have recognized the hazards of using evidence of desire to prevail competitively
to forecast economic harm." Id. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the
reliance on intent as a forecast of economic harm in the law of monopolization "must
tread a narrow pathway between rules that would inhibit honest competition and
those that would allow pernicious but subtle conduct to escape antitrust scrutiny."
Id.
To prevent unnecessary judicial interference with healthy competition, the
Eighth Circuit has in some cases required a separate showing of "predatory or an-
ticompetitive conduct" even where direct evidence of intent has been established.
See Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 904 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985); Trace X
Chem., Inc. v. Canadian Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1160 (1985); accord William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028 n.6 ("direct evidence of
intent alone, without corroborating evidence of conduct, cannot sustain a claim of
attempted monopolization") One commentator has noted:
[T]he availability of evidence of improper intent is often a function of luck
and of the defendant's legal sophistication, not of the underlying reality. A
firm of executives sensitized to antitrust problems will not leave any docu-
mentary trail of improper intent; [on the other hand], one whose executives
lack this sensitivity will often create rich evidence of such intent simply by
clumsy choice of words to describe innocent behavior ... [Thus], any doc-
trine that relies upon proof of intent is going to be applied erratically at
best.
R. POSNER, supra, at 189-90 (cited in William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028 n.6).
229. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 599-600 (conduct must be shown to be "rational eco-
nomic behavior").
230. If not, the conduct is said to be one "without legitimate business purpose."
Such conduct is not competitive but rather a means of eliminating competition. Cf.
William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1030-31 n.16, (citingJanich Bros. Inc. v. American Distil-
ling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978)).
231. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1344.
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practices. 23 2 These courts would hold pricing at below average vari-
able cost presumptively predatory and prices above average variable
cost presumptively valid.233 While some courts have found prices
above the average total cost to be predatory, 23 4 the Eighth Circuit
has adopted the view that pricing above the average total cost is pre-
sumptively valid.235 Thus, evidence that the price is above the aver-
age variable cost of the product will rebut the presumption of
predatory intent. 2
3 6
In addition to price/cost comparisons, direct evidence of preda-
tory intent may also be shown by documents or the seller's conduct.
Thus, in William Inglis, there was documentary evidence that an in-
dependent consultant retained by Continental had recommended
"price maintenance" as a means of "hasten[ing] wholesaler exit."237
In addition, there was direct evidence of predatory conduct by the
seller. Continental's salesforce particularly focused on Inglis' ac-
counts and actively made competitive offers for those accounts.
238
Inglis alleged that evidence of various conduct by Continental's man-
agement indicated an intent to injure Inglis. 23 9 Where such direct
evidence is available, the plaintiff's burden of proof is considerably
lighter than when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence.
When the plaintiff relies on circumstantial inferences, the plaintiff
must prove not only predatory intent, but also actual conduct cor-
roborating such intent.240
In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiff may rely on infer-
ences drawn from circumstantial evidence to show predatory intent.
For example, defendant's pricing at unprofitable levels even though
more profitable means are available may signal predatory intent.
24 1
The weight given to circumstantial evidence will depend upon the
nature of the market. For example, where there are significant entry
232. See id.
233. Id. at 1345-46; accord Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227, 233-36 (1st Cir. 1983).
234. William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1034-36.
235. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1346 ("at some point, competitors should know for certain
they are pricing legally, and . . . this point should be average total cost.") (citing
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 229, 233-36 (1st Cir. 1980)).
236. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 598.
237. William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1055. "Predation exists when the justification of
these prices is based, not on their effectiveness in minimizing losses but on their
tendency to eliminate rivals .... " Id. at 1035. The existence of other loss minimiz-
ing alternatives may also lead to the same conclusion. Id. at 1037.
238. See id. at 1025.
239. Id. at 1039.
240. Id. at 1030.
241. In Callaway, the court found that no other workable alternatives were avail-
able to the defendant in that case. Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442.
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barriers, greater weight will be placed on evidence of predatory in-
tent, even if it is circumstantial.
To further ensure that competitiveness is not unduly restricted,
the Eighth Circuit, in addition to requiring evidence of both discrim-
inatory conduct and intent, requires that the defendant have the abil-
ity to dominate the market. The theory being that absent such
capacity to dominate, there exists no possibility of lessening compe-
tition in the market.242 In Falls City, however, the Supreme Court
rejected the large versus small competitor distinction made by the
lower, court, and found no economically justified reason why evi-
dence of discriminatory pricing should not be used to infer competi-
tive injury in cases where the favored competitor is not necessarily
large.243
Whether or not the elimination of specific competitors will be sig-
nificant in determining injury depends on the proportion of the mar-
ket that is injured.244 Thus, even though evidence of sales lost by
the plaintiff is relevant, it is not dispositive.245 Again, the inferences
are rebuttable with evidence of factors other than the proferred evi-
dence which may be reasonably expected to cause the injury.246 The
Court in Falls City sought a compromise by establishing that where
there are other factors contributing to the plaintiff's demise, in addi-
tion to a Robinson-Patman violation, it is proper to apportion the
harm.24
7
B. Level II: Justification for Price Discrimination
If the plaintiff succeeds in showing prohibited competitive injury,
either through market analysis or by evidence of individual injury
plus predatory intent, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
advance evidence justifying its conduct. This section addresses the
242. Henty, 809 F.2d at 1345 ("if the price-cutter cannot dominate... competition
is not seriously or permanently damaged"); accord William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1027-28
(the weight of the evidence will depend on the market structure and the characteris-
tics of the defendant such as its market power).
243. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 436. "Although concerns about the excessive market
power of larger purchasers were primarily responsible for passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act, [it] is of general applicability and prohibits discriminations generally."
Id. (citing FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 522 (1963)); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 101-39 (1977); ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 182 (1962).
244. Lomar, 824 F.2d at 597.
245. Short, 799 F.2d at 421; William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1025.
246. In Falls City, the defendant attempted to show that the plaintiff's sales loss
was not unique to the given market since plaintiff was also losing sales in other mar-
kets where the defendant was not using discriminatory pricing practices. Falls City,
460 U.S. at 437.
247. Id.
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evidentiary requirements when the defendant seeks to justify its
area-wide pricing practices under the meeting competition defense.
Once the plaintiff has established competitive injury, there is a
primafacie violation of Section 2 and to be exonerated the defendant
must showjustification.248 The evidentiary requirements at this level
go mainly toward establishing good faith. Whether the defendant's
conduct shows good faith depends on such factors as the size of the
competitors, 249 the level of price competition,250 the geographic
area covered,251 the industry or market characteristics,252 the history
and trend of pricing in the specific geographic region,253 and the
duration of the competitive price offer.254
What is required in order to satisfy the standard of good faith in
each case depends on the specific industry and general practices of
the trade. 255 In addition, some courts have taken the relative sizes of
248. Id.
249. Id. at 449; accord Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442 (requirement of customer-by-cus-
tomer pricing would be "burdensome, unreasonable, and practically unfeasible").
The Callaway court believed that one reason for allowing territorial pricing is to free
smaller sellers from expending financial and administrative resources to confirm the
availability of competitor's prices in the region with individual buyers. Id.
250. Surprise Brassiere Co., 71 F.T.C. at 963 (Surprise failed to show the competitive
necessity for its discrimination). But see Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,
231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956), in which the court held
that area-wide pricing was permissible given that the competition in the market was
"so intense that the price structure for the said product was very badly broken
down." Id. at 358 n.1.
251. See McCareins, supra note 185, at 1321. Area-wide pricing is permissible pro-
vided that the lower price is made available only in a restricted geographic area.
"The courts that have allowed a seller to institute area-wide price reductions to meet
competition have done so after extensive analysis of the areas in which the territorial
price reductions were offered." Id. at 1328. Perfect overlap is not required.
252. See FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 42, at 415-16. "[Tlhe Fifth Circuit
has upheld the adoption by one company of its competitor's entire pricing system in
light of particular industry characteristics." Id. (emphasis added); see also Callaway, 362
F.2d at 441-42 (the Commission completely disregarded the realities of the competi-
tive conditions prevalent in the carpeting industry).
253. Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442.
254. A seller may continue to offer the lower price only as long as the competitive
offer remains. Accord Falls City, 460 U.S. at 451 (area-wide pricing "may continue only
as long as the competitive circumstances justifying it . . . persist."); see also FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 42, at 435 ("If a seller continues its discrimination beyond
the period reasonably necessary to meet the competition, it will lose its Section 2(b)
defense."); see, e.g., Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1969). Cf.
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1968) (good faith not
established because seller continued to offer lower price, even though competitor
withdrew from the market about six months after the initial offer), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 977 (1968).
255. Continental Baking, 63 F.T.C. at 2163. "[T]he same method of meeting com-
petition may be consistent with an inference of good faith in some circumstances,
inconsistent with such an inference in others." Id.
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the competitors,256 and duration of competitive offer and pricing
trends in the region into account. 257 In Inglis and earlier decisions,
area-wide pricing was allowed only if the market was intensely com-
petitive and seller had no other practical non-discriminatory alterna-
tives to meeting competition.258 In Callaway, the Fifth Circuit
sanctioned the adoption of competitor's pricing system in light of the
particular industry characteristics.259 Furthermore, the volume dis-
count system in Callaway was found to be "a thoughtfully tailored"
response to competitive conditions prevalent in the carpeting indus-
try.2 60 Thus, the verification requirements of Inglis were established
with respect to the specifics of the market.261
In area-wide pricing situations, good faith may be inferred from
proof that the lower price was limited only to the group of customers
reasonably believed to have been tempted by the low prices. 262
Every area-wide pricing analysis must begin with a definition of the
relevant market. Until Falls City, a seller was required to ensure that
price reductions were only offered in the area where the competitor's
prices were equally low. 263 The standard was deliberately strict be-
cause of the perceived "evil" consequence of area-wide pricing.2 64
256. See Klein, supra note 185, at 238. "Results of the cases would indicate that
the larger concern .. . cannot adopt as aggressive a posture ... as a smaller enter-
prise." Id.; see also Note, Effective Competition and The Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REV.
1289, 1336 (1948) (one must look at the number of competitors, the size of the mar-
ket and the relative size of the players). Contra FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 513
n.8 (1963) (size of competitor is irrelevant).
257. See Klein, supra note 185, at 233-34.
258. See McCareins, supra note 185, at 1320; See also Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442
(seller may grant competitive volume discount, especially where "no workable alter-
native is evident").
259. Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442. For further discussion on the subject see FEDERAL
ANT-rruST LAW, supra note 42, at 415-16. See also Note, The "Meeting Competition"
Defense of the Robinson-Patman Act and Quantity Discount Systems, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 802
(1967); Recent Decisions, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 618 (1966); Recent Cases, 20 VAND.
L. REV. 635 (1966).
260. Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442; see generally Note, supra note 256. The effect of any
pricing decision is best seen by evaluating the particular industry or market structure.
"It is interesting to see how industry absorbs the impact of public laws in ways not
quite foreseen." Note, supra note 256, at 1336.
261. See McCareins, supra note 185, at 1320. If the market is one where competi-
tor's price can easily be verified, then seller must show such facts. Id.
262. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 450.
263. William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1046. "[T]he price competition zone cannot be
perceived to be smaller than the zone of (seller's] price reduction." Id.
264. Other courts similarly have found an inherent "evil" in the practice of area-
wide pricing. See General Gas Corp. v. National Util. of Gainsville, Inc., 271 F.2d 820
(5th Cir. 1959).
It appears from the evidence here that competitors of the defendant corpo-
ration were cutting their prices from time to time on a customer basis and,
while defendant contends that its broad price cuts in the.., area were good
faith reductions to meet the equally low price of a competitor, it seems clear
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The courts that have allowed sellers to institute area-wide price re-
ductions to meet competition have done so only after extensive anal-
ysis of the area in which the territorial price reductions were offered.
This has led to recommendations that the seller perform extensive
evaluation of the competitor's pricing zone, and then offer its price
only within the region in which the competitor's new prices have
been offered.265 In Falls City, however, the Court did not require this
extensive analysis of the zone of competitor's price offers. Thus,
Falls City seems to have broadened the area of application beyond the
restricted geographic zone. 2
66
Prior to Falls City, sellers had to approach area-wide pricing cau-
tiously. They were required to limit area-wide pricing to the specific
region in which their competitor's lower prices were generally avail-
able, and the particular market had to be intensely price competitive.
In addition, the Staley standard was applied more strictly when the
seller had not verified the competitive price in the region.26 7 Falls
City only requires that the seller choosing territorial pricing, rather
than individual pricing show, that the decision is a genuine, reason-
able response to prevailing competitive circumstances.268 Falls City
notwithstanding, sellers must approach any area-wide pricing de-
fense with caution since area-wide pricing is still strictly scruti-
nized. 26 9 A seller who cannot meet these requirements is best
that there is this situation: The competitors of General were struggling for
business and cutting prices on a customer basis and defendant, General,
becoming tired of the struggle customer by customer, declared war with a
drastic price reduction over the area in which plaintiff competes.
Id. at 825; see also Surprise Brassiere Co. v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 1969);
Exquisite Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
959 (1966); Standard Motor Products, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Ingram v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176, 183-
84 (D.N.M. 1966); In Re Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 958, 966-67 (1955); see
generally Klein, supra note 185, at 1321 n.71.
265. Accord William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1046 (well-defined geographic region); Fos-
ter Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964) (price extended to all customers
within the restricted geographic area brought it within Staley's "reasonable, prudent
and good faith" standard), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); Balian Ice Cream v. Ar-
den Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1956) (first Court of Appeals to sanction area-
wide "blanket price cut"); see also McCareins, supra note 185, at 1331 (area-wide pric-
ing permissible only within restricted geographic area).
266. See McCareins, supra note 185, at 1330 n. 118. ("Falls City area definition ...
may have created the opportunity for sellers, under the guises of area-wide pricing,
to negotiate individualized, selective price cuts with preferred buyers to the detri-
ment of other buyers in the same region.").
267. When the seller actually knew or verified the prices, however, the defense
was allowed. See International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,
725-26 (seller need only demonstrate that its pricing systems were a reasonable
method of meeting competitor's lower price), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
268. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 451-52.
269. See McCareins, supra note 185, at 1331.
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advised to limit its pricing response to individual customers. 270
Reasonable belief cannot be based upon assumptions. When a be-
lief is based on "assumptions or speculations," the defendant is re-
quired to undertake some investigation in order to verify the
belief.271 Furthermore, the belief cannot be based on defendant's
experiences in other markets, or even in the same market with differ-
ent competitors. Because the meeting-competition defense invokes
a fact-specific inquiry, when investigation is undertaken, the good
faith requirement demands specificity. Such investigation must be
undertaken with respect to the particular products in the given mar-
ket, and must focus on the actual competitors whose lower prices are
suspected. General investigations of pricing practices will not suffice
at this level.272
In addition, the lower price offered to meet competition may con-
tinue for only as long as the competitive offer exists.273 Some courts
have held that a defendant does not forfeit the meeting competition
defense in area-wide pricing by failing to document knowledge of
available competive prices.274 In Callaway, the Fifth Circuit found
that such a vigorous evidentiary requirement would be too burden-
some on the defendant.275 This conclusion was based on the fact
that there were many competitors and several product lines. Never-
theless, a seller should attempt to document as many of the facts as
possible since the meeting competition defense is fact-specific. The
degree of verification that will be required depends on the given
market characteristics and the nature of the competition.
The seller ... must respond to a competitor's area-wide prices in a "well-
tailored," reasonable, good faith, and prudent manner. At a minimum, the
seller must adequately verify the existence of the competitor's territorial offer,
carefully assess the parameters of the competitor's "pricing zone," and offer the
price only to buyers within the region in which the competitor's new prices
have been offered. In addition, seller must adequately verify the duration of
the competitor's area-wide prices, and limit its response to the same time
period.
Id. (emphasis added).
270. See Klein, supra note 185. "An enterprise seeking to employ area-wide pric-
ing must analyze in detail the market factors in specific locations so as to be able to
determine a course of conduct which is responsive but not over-responsive." Id. at
238. "Market factors include the competing sellers, their size, market positions in
the territory, the history and trend of prices in the area." Id.
271. Rose Confections, Inc., 816 F.2d at 392 ("When defendant's belief is founded
on assumptions or speculation, the good-faith element ...requires that it make
some attempt to investigate or verify its belief.")
272. Id.
273. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 450; Klein, supra note 185, at 233-34.
274. William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1046 ("The defendant knew of competitive prices
actually available. . .even though it did not document" rigorously).
275. Callaway, 362 F.2d at 442.
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C. Verification
Underlying the requirements enumerated above is the verification
requirement which is at the heart of any meeting competition de-
fense.276 In Inglis, the defendant was engaged in the sale of two dif-
ferent brands of bread, "private label" and "advertised label." The
market for private label was intensely competitive, but there were
fewer accounts in that market than there were in the advertised label
market.277 In the less competitive advertised label market, the de-
fendant engaged in a rather elaborate verification procedure when-
ever a customer claimed lower price offers from Continental's
competitors.278 In the private label market, however, Continental
engaged in area-wide pricing without verification or investigation.
Continental sought to justify its conduct on the ground that because
of the relatively few accounts in this market, there was a substantial
degree of communication among the accounts. As a result of the
communication, any price offers to one account quickly became
known in other accounts. 2 79 The Court rejected Continental's argu-
ment, finding that "[gliven the smaller number of private label ac-
276. See FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAw, supra note 42, at 390. "It is clear that good faith
requires seller who intends to rely on the meeting competition defense to attempt to
verify the offers at [sic] lower prices allegedly made by the seller's competitors which
are the basis of its defense." Id; see also McCareins, supra note 185, at 1320 (seller
must show such facts as to validate the parameters of competitor's prices); accord
Boise Cascade Corp., 107 F.T.C. 76 (1986), rev'don other grounds, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (in order to show good faith, seller is required to verify the actual exist-
ence of the competitive offer). "However, verification requirements stop short of
direct communication with the competitor." Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 454-55; accord Wil-
liam Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1044-47.
The Fifth Circuit, in Callaway, downplayed the importance of the evidentiary re-
quirements of the meeting competition defense by holding that Callaway did not
need to show its list price as evidence that its prices were equal to those being met.
Callaway, 362 F.2d at 443-44. Callaway was required only to show facts which would
lead a "reasonable and prudent person to believe," that the lower price would in fact
meet competition. Id. While this language would seem to impose a lower evidentiary
burden on the defendant, it should be noted that Callaway produced substantial evi-
dence to support its good faith argument. Furthermore, the court reversed the Com-
mission's decision on the grounds that the hearing examiner failed to take Callaway's
evidence into consideration. Id. at 444. Thus, the evidentiary issue in Callaway was
not one of sufficiency, but rather the Commission's failure to adequately consider the
available evidence.
277. William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1046.
278. Id. n.55. The procedure included extensive corroboration from several
levels of management to and including the comptroller and division vice presidents
of the customer. Continental only extended discounts to its customers after this ex-
tensive verification. Furthermore, even when the lower prices were verified, the dis-
counts were limited to those accounts where competitive offers had been proven. It
did not make the reduced prices available to the entire market as it did in the private
label market.
279. Id. at 1047.
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counts, documentation of competitive offers for those accounts
would have been easier than verification for advertised label reduc-
tions."280 Area-wide pricing is permissible, but only when there is a
reasonable basis to believe that equally low offers are available from
competitors throughout the market.28' While Falls City requires only
that the seller reasonably know in good faith that the price is avail-
able in the region,282 Inglis, and now Boise, require more. 28 3 Falls
City remains the Supreme Court's broadest application of the Morton
Salt inference.284 A seller relying on the Court's language must be
cognizant of later decisions which have limited its application. 285 A
seller must show facts to support its belief that the lower price is
available from a competitor.286
CONCLUSION
After fifty years, the judicial path of area-wide pricing appears less
cloudy. There is now an indication of a relaxed standard for the
meeting competition defense. Whether this trend will continue re-
mains to be seen.2 87 . What is clear, however, is that the future of the
280. Id. at 1047-48. Continental's failure to verify in this case was found to be the
type of conduct condemned by the Robinson-Patman Act.
281. William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1046 (Continental could not escape its verification
duty given the small number of customers and the relative ease of certainty within the
well-defined geographic region). In Callaway, the court found that this requirement
would be unreasonable given the large number of competitors in the market. Cal-
laway, 362 F.2d at 441. Continental did not have a similar justification.
282. Falls City, 460 U.S. at 451. A seller should not be required to expend signifi-
cant efforts to confirm the lower price from each buyer when the seller reasonably
knows in good faith from verified sources that its competitor's lower prices have been
extended throughout the region.
283. Boise Cascade Corp., 107 F.T.C. 76 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 837 F.2d 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1988). "Mere recitiation of a meeting competition formula does not prove
the requisite good faith, which is more than a sworn-to state of mind." Id. at -.
284. Id. at 1139.
285. Falls City notwithstanding, a seller must attempt to investigate or verify any
assumptions or market speculations. Rose Confections Co., 816 F.2d at 392.
286. Viviano Macaroni, 411 F.2d at 259. "While we can sympathize with the diffi-
culty petitioner has in finding precise information as to the identity of competitors
and the amount of offers .... we think that it is clear from the Supreme Court ... that
petitioner was under a duty to investigate or verify .... Id. The court held that the
defendant's failure to provide references as to the terms of the competitive offer and
its lack of diligence in verifying lower price, indicated lack of good faith. Cf. National
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1968) (seller's knowledge of indus-
try costs should have placed it on notice that the reported price was unlikely; there-
fore seller did not satisfy the good faith requirement); see also Continental Baking Co.
v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 108 (9th Cir. 1973) (where an unnamed
competitor was alleged to be negotiating with customer, the court found such evi-
dence insufficient to establish good faith).
287. See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 1-2 n.5 for a list of cases in which federal
courts have applied more flexible standards in analyzing pricing practices.
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Act will depend to a large extent on whether the Commission and
courts continue to apply flexible standards. Flexible application of
the statutory defenses will go a long way toward ensuring a stable
future for the Robinson-Patman Act. These recent decisions, giving
businesses greater pricing flexibility, signal a movement in the right
direction and the coming of age of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Angela Nwaneri
48
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss4/4
